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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Presumed Unintentional: The Ironic Effects of Implicit Bias Framing  
on Whites’ Perceptions of Discrimination 
 
by 
 
Ivuoma N. Onyeador 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Professor Jenessa Rachel Shapiro, Chair 
 
Awareness of implicit bias has increased dramatically over the last decade. Indeed, news 
articles often cite implicit bias as central to discriminatory incidents and, as one high-profile 
example, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted implicit bias during the second 
debate of the 2016 presidential campaign. This has generally been met with enthusiasm by both 
activists and researchers. However, the present research suggests that framing racial bias in terms 
of implicit bias may have some unintended harmful consequences. Specifically, I argue that 
biases framed as implicit may reduce Whites’ perceptions of the intent involved in instances of 
discrimination, which should, in turn, reduce perceptions of perpetrator blame, the severity of the 
discrimination, and the necessity for punishment of the perpetrator. Four experiments found 
support for these hypotheses. Across three studies, framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias, 
rather than explicit bias or providing no information about bias, reduced Whites’ perceptions of 
  iii 
perpetrator intentionality, and perceived intentionality mediated the relationship between implicit 
bias framing and perpetrator blame, incident severity, and support for punishment. This pattern 
was identified in discriminatory incidents that were mundane, in the context of customer service 
(Experiment 1); that were less common and more harmful, in the context of a police shooting 
(Experiment 2); and in which the perpetrator expresses explicitly biased beliefs, in the context of 
a workplace meeting between a manager and a new employee (Experiment 3). An additional 
study experimentally tested the proposed mechanism of perceived intent by manipulating intent 
and examining the effect on the measured outcomes (Experiment 4). The present findings 
suggest that, in contrast to the goal of raising awareness about implicit bias, framing racial bias 
in terms of implicit bias can undermine perceptions of the severity of discrimination. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“I think implicit bias is a problem for everyone, not just police. I think, unfortunately, too many 
of us in our great country jump to conclusions about each other. And therefore, I think we need 
all of us to be asking hard questions about, you know, ‘Why am I feeling this way?’” -Hillary 
Clinton, 2016 presidential candidate for the Democratic party 
 
“As soon as she said implicit bias is a problem for everybody, not just police, I cheered to 
myself.” -Rinku Sen, executive director of Race Forward 
 “The whole point of the theory of implicit bias—the reason why it can fairly be attributed to 
everyone—is that it’s not an accusation of guilt or bigotry. It’s an acknowledgment of the human 
condition.” William Saletan, author of Bearing Right  
 
In 2016, the concept of implicit bias was publicized in a particularly high profile manner: 
a mention during the second presidential debate by the Democrat and first woman nominee, 
Hillary Rodham Clinton. This mention launched numerous opinion pieces from the political right 
and left and represented an achievement for racial justice advocates and implicit bias researchers 
who have been working to raise awareness about implicit bias for many years (Hayward, 2016; 
Saletan, 2016; Stockman, 2016). The epigraph also includes the reaction of Rinku Sen, the 
executive director of racial justice organization, Race Forward, who expressed elation at 
Clinton’s mention of implicit bias and her assertion that it is a problem for everyone. Generally, 
this mention was perceived by those who are concerned about racial injustice to be a positive 
outcome.  
These quotes from Clinton and Sen illustrate the belief that raising awareness about 
implicit bias is important for addressing discrimination (e.g., Jost, Rudman, Blair, Carney, 
Dasgupta, Glaser, & Hardin, 2009). However, it is not clear that the spread of information about 
implicit bias will indeed reduce discrimination. If racial discrimination becomes strongly 
associated with implicit bias, this change might have negative consequences. The third quote in 
the epigraph offers an illustrative example. Writing to conservatives who were offended by the 
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attribution of implicit bias to “everyone,” William Saletan went a step beyond Clinton’s 
statement, and made two claims of note. One, that implicit bias does not indicate guilt or racism, 
and two, that beyond being attributable to everyone, implicit bias exemplifies the human 
condition. Both claims suggest less culpability for discrimination that is associated with implicit 
bias than discrimination that is associated explicit bias. The first, by absolving those who exhibit 
implicit bias from guilt for their behaviors and neutralizing ascriptions of racism. The second, by 
depicting implicit bias as inherent to human nature, potentially casting discrimination that results 
from it as not wrong or worthy of concern.  
Thus, the consequences of framing discrimination as resulting specifically from implicit 
bias are unclear. As researchers, practitioners, and many commentators have argued, attributing 
ongoing disparities to implicit bias could be imperative for reducing contemporary 
discrimination and moving our society closer to equality—after all, we cannot fix that which we 
do not acknowledge. On the other hand, framing discrimination as resulting from implicit bias 
may do just the opposite, casting perpetrators of discrimination as less blameworthy and 
suggesting that discriminatory behaviors are less harmful and less deserving of punishment than 
would otherwise be the case. The present research examines this question.  
What is implicit bias? 
First, how is implicit bias generally conceptualized? Research on implicit bias argues that 
individuals can associate racial minorities, like African-Americans, with concepts and 
stereotypes, like inferiority or danger, outside of their conscious awareness, and further, that 
these unconscious associations can influence the evaluation and treatment of members of these 
groups (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald & Krieger, 2006). The literature on implicit 
and explicit bias finds that implicit bias tends to predict spontaneous, nonverbal behaviors, 
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whereas explicit bias tends to predict deliberative, verbal behaviors (Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, 1990; Wilson et al., 2000). The unconscious negative associations that 
give rise to implicit bias, and the spontaneous, nonverbal discriminatory behaviors that result 
from implicit bias, stand in contrast to many Americans’ stated beliefs in egalitarianism and their 
disavowal of prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Implicit bias is argued to be one explanation 
for the persistence of racial disparities despite the drop in explicit negative attitudes as measured 
in survey research (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997).  
Implicit bias has come to command considerable empirical and popular attention. A 
Google Scholar search of “implicit bias” returns 1.38 million results. Some scholars argue that in 
social psychology, the way racial bias is conceptualized has shifted from explicit and intentional 
to implicit and unintentional (Forscher & Devine, 2016; Richeson & Sommers, 2016), additional 
evidence of the impressive spread of the concept. An examination of Google Trends data suggest 
that implicit bias reached its peak popularity in October of 2016, following Hillary Clinton’s 
mention during the second presidential debate. To date, 25 million people have visited the 
Project Implicit website, which conducts research and provides education about implicit bias 
(Lai, 2017). Finally, national media outlets regularly publish pieces on implicit bias (e.g., 
Mengell, 2017; Nordell, 2017; Singal, 2017). Despite the spread of the concept of implicit bias 
from social psychology labs to everyday parlance, the implications of attributing racial 
discrimination to implicit bias and linking it to unconscious processes have not yet been directly 
examined. 
Implicit bias knowledge may increase attributions to discrimination  
In practice, one can see how telling people about implicit bias might shift attitudes and 
reduce discrimination, as suggested by the Clinton and Sen quotes in the epigraph. According to 
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the Confronting Prejudiced Responses model, identifying subtle discrimination as racist is the 
first step for confronting discrimination (Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008), suggesting 
that awareness of implicit bias might be necessary for ultimately addressing contemporary 
discrimination that results from implicit bias. There is some empirical evidence to support this 
possibility. In 2007, there was widespread media publicity of research finding that from 1991-
2002 NBA referees exhibited racial bias in their foul calls (Price & Wolfers, 2010). An analysis 
of data from 2007-2010, after the publicity of the findings, found that the disparity in foul calls 
had disappeared (Pope, Price, & Wolfers, 2014). This example from the field suggests that when 
people are presented with evidence of biased outcomes that they are responsible for, they are 
more vigilant about the bias, and are able to eliminate racial disparities.  
As a second example, this time in a laboratory context, researchers found that Whites 
who are high in bias awareness, or the knowledge of and concern about subtle biases, are more 
likely to report that subtly discriminatory behaviors are racist than Whites who are low in bias 
awareness (Perry, Murphy, & Dovidio, 2015). Bias awareness did not predict whether blatantly 
discriminatory behaviors were identified as racist, because there was more agreement about 
whether those incidents were racist. This work suggests that bias awareness can facilitate 
attributions to discrimination for subtle forms of racism. These studies are just two examples of 
the many studies about the extent of contemporary forms of discrimination and the utility of 
awareness of bias. As a result of research about implicit bias, organizations as diverse as 
universities, technology companies, and police departments are heavily investing in workshops 
that teach their members about what is often termed “unconscious bias,” in order to reduce the 
effect of implicit bias on organizational racial disparities.  
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Implicit bias knowledge may reduce perceptions of intent  
Despite the potential benefits of bringing attention to implicit biases, the quote from 
William Saletan illustrates that awareness of implicit bias can also be used to absolve those who 
discriminate of blame for their behavior. In order to be blamed for an action, a person must 
display intent to commit a particular action (Shaver, 1985), a relationship I will return to in a 
subsequent section. People perceive intent from actions that reflect an actor’s desire, belief, 
intention, awareness, and ability to complete an action (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Specifically, an 
empirical examination of lay theories of intent provided evidence that a useful distinction can be 
made between intentions, or the decision to act, which depend on one’s beliefs and desires with 
respect to the action, and the intentionality of actions, which is determined by the intention to 
act, the ability to perform an action, and awareness of committing a particular action (Malle & 
Knobe, 1997). Implicit bias likely calls some of these factors into question, given the portrayal 
that it operates outside of conscious awareness.  
Scholars have also discussed intent as it relates to stereotyping and prejudice, particularly 
in light of research in cognitive science that finds that stereotyping results from general cognitive 
processes, and can be automatically elicited even by those who profess to be nonprejudiced (e.g., 
Devine, 1989). Fiske (1989, 2004) defined intent as being evident when one makes a voluntary 
choice among options, like whether to use stereotypes or to individuate an outgroup member 
when evaluating them, and is particularly evident when one makes a non-dominant choice rather 
than a dominant choice. The former option can be considered the dominant option, with its 
cultural and cognitive roots, while the latter can be considered the non-dominant option, as it 
requires expending effort to overcome commonly-held stereotypes. Intent is clearer when one 
chooses a non-dominant option, in this example, when one individuates an outgroup member. 
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However, the dominant option, using stereotypes, can still be said to be intentional, even though 
it is arguably a subtler form of intent, because the actor had the choice to individuate. If an 
individual has no choice, like a child who has been told all Black people are criminals, then 
behaving in line with that belief, the child assuming a Black person is a criminal, arguably 
cannot be voluntary or intentional. Implicit bias might make stereotyping an even more dominant 
option and thus make it more difficult to assert that one’s behavior indicated intent. This suggests 
that intent might be attenuated when discrimination is framed in terms of implicit bias. 
In addition to voluntary choice, there are several concepts related to intent, and research 
examining these concepts can help us understand how intent affects evaluations of actions. A 
second concept that is related to intent is how controllable an action is. Intent and control are 
highly related (Anderson, 1983) but intent is ascribed to actions, whereas control is ascribed to 
the cause of actions (Weiner, 1985). A third concept that is related to intent is free will. If a 
behavior is the result of conscious intent, it is said to result from free will, meaning that people 
believe the action was freely chosen (Klemm, 2010). In sum, choice, control, and free will can be 
seen as proxies for the intentionality of an action. 
As an aside, there are longstanding intellectual debates about whether free will is truly 
possible. Skepticism about free will is bolstered by many findings from behavioral, cognitive, 
and neuroscience literatures, for example, findings suggesting that unconscious brain activity 
precedes conscious awareness of actions (e.g., Libet, 1985) or that many of our responses are 
automatic, as is the case in implicit bias (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Similar findings and 
approaches underpin the theoretical basis for implicit bias. 
Perceptions of intent are important because they determine how people evaluate and 
respond to harmful actions. A long history of research on intent argues that perceptions of intent 
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are central to perceptions of behaviors, including harm (e.g., Ames & Fiske, 2015), blame (e.g., 
Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014), and punishment (e.g., Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 
2009). 
Perceptions of intent and evaluations of harm  
First, a couple of studies have found that individuals see an incident as more harmful if 
the act that caused the harm was intentional compared to if it was not (Ames & Fiske, 2015, 
Horai & Bartek, 1978). In one set of studies, the authors manipulated whether a CEO who made 
a poor investment harmed his employees intentionally, making the investment because he 
believed losing money would make them work harder, or unintentionally, making the investment 
because he erroneously believed it would be a sound investment (Ames & Fiske, 2015). 
Participants in the intentional condition viewed the same harm, the employees making less 
money and being less financially stable, as worse than participants in the unintentional condition. 
The authors found evidence that what they term blame motivation—participants’ desire to assign 
blame, express moral condemnation, and dole out punishment when harm is detected, mediated 
the relationship between intent and perceived harm.  
Further, a harmful act, like poisoning someone, is perceived to be more morally wrong if 
the act is intentional than if it is accidental (Young & Saxe, 2011). In these studies, participants 
are asked to imagine a scenario where a person commits some harm, cooking a dish with peanuts 
for a dinner guest with a peanut allergy. The researchers manipulated whether the harm was 
committed intentionally, because the perpetrator knew their dinner guest had an allergy, or 
unintentionally, because the perpetrator did not know their dinner guest had an allergy. When the 
harm was committed unintentionally, the act of cooking the dish with an allergen was seen as 
less wrong.  
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Perceptions of intent and evaluations of blame 
A second evaluation that perceived intent has been shown to influence is 
blameworthiness. In general, people consider whether one should have, or could have, prevented 
an event when deciding how much to blame someone for it (Weiner, 1995). Malle and 
colleagues (2014) have argued that blame is not only an attribution of moral responsibility made 
by an individual person, but also a social act that guides the behavior of other people. As with 
harm, acts that are described as intentional are attributed more blame (and praise) than acts that 
are described as accidental or unintentional (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2008; Malle & Bennett, 2002; 
Ohtsubo, 2007; Shaver, 1985).  
As discussed earlier, there are number of constructs related to intent and research 
examining those constructs reveals similar effects on blame. Controllable actions, those an 
individual has the capacity to change, also induce more blame than uncontrollable actions 
(Graham et al., 1995; Weiner, 1993). Similarly, the belief in free will reflects a desire to blame 
others for their actions (Clark, Luguri, Ditto, Knobe, Shariff, & Baumeister, 2014). And indeed, 
a set of studies found that if one’s belief in free will was challenged, respondents blamed a 
perpetrator less for their behavior (Shariff, Greene, Karremans, Luguri, Clark, Schooler, 
Baumeister, & Vohs, 2014). In these studies, belief in free will was reduced by having 
participants read passages arguing against free will or passages reporting neuroscience findings 
that suggest one’s actions might not necessarily reflect their intentions. After those readings, 
participants blamed a perpetrator less than if they had read a neutral passage.  
Perceptions of intent and support for punishment  
Another important response to the behavior of others, particularly harmful behaviors, is 
punishment. A number of findings suggest that intent, harm, and blame all contribute to whether 
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and how much observers support negative consequences, like punishment, for actors who harm 
others. As has been the pattern, respondents support more punishment for acts committed by 
actors who intended to harm their targets than for acts committed by those who did not 
(Cushman, et al., 2009; Horai & Bartek, 1978). In one novel application of the ultimatum game, 
participants were asked to indicate their responses to selfish, fair, or generous intentions, and 
selfish, fair, or generous outcomes of their partner’s actions in the game. There were a number of 
findings of note, but most relevant to this argument, of the six, participants responded with the 
most punishment, operationalized as reallocation of funds, to behavior that resulted in selfish 
outcomes, followed by behavior that indicated selfish intent.  
Intent also exacerbates punishment in our legal system, where murder is defined as the 
intentional, premeditated killing of another person and involuntary manslaughter is defined as an 
unintentional killing that results from negligence or recklessness. More severe punishment is 
reserved for the former type of killing because of its association with malicious intent (Finkel, 
1995; Singer, 1985). Individuals also respond with more aggression to people who indicate intent 
to aggress against them (Taylor, Shuntich, & Greenberg, 1979). In addition, the severity of the 
harm resulting from an act is an important factor that people use to justify the amount of 
punishment given to a perpetrator. The more harm caused by an action, the more severe the 
punishment (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002).  
Several empirical examinations of the effect of constructs related to intent on punishment 
evaluations comport with these effects. As discussed earlier, reducing the belief in free will 
reduced perceptions of blameworthiness.  Similarly, reducing belief in free will also reduces 
support for punishment (Shariff, et al, 2014). Subsequent research has found that rather than 
belief in free will generally, it is specifically the possibility that an actor chose their action that is 
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central to blame and punishment judgments (Monroe, Brady, & Malle, 2017). Other work has 
identified that the capacity for agency (including self-control) is strongly correlated with 
judgments that one deserves punishment (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Relatedly, those who 
exhibit a lack of effort to prevent a controllable negative outcome incite anger and are punished 
more than those who exhibit a lack of ability to prevent an uncontrollable negative outcome, who 
induce sympathy (Weiner, 1993; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). 
Ultimately, perceptions of intent are related to detecting harm, motivation to blame actors, and 
support for punishment of people who harm others. The less intent perceived to be related to an 
action, the less harm is perceived, the less the actor is blamed, and the less observers support 
punishing them. 
Implicit bias knowledge may decrease attributions to discrimination  
The literature reviewed to this point suggests that on the one hand, calling attention to 
implicit bias may increase awareness of a difficult to detect form of bias and as a result, increase 
one’s ability to identify and ultimately reduce, discrimination. On the other hand, there are 
findings that suggest that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias could reduce perceptions of 
intentionality and as a result, reduce perceptions of blame and harm, which should in turn reduce 
the likelihood of considering a discriminatory behavior worthy of addressing or punishing. 
Supporting the latter relationship between implicit bias and reduced perceptions of intent 
is research finding that intent can directly influence evaluations of race-related actions.  As an 
example, when a perpetrator’s intent was clearly discriminatory, observers perceived more 
prejudice than when the perpetrator’s intent was clearly non-discriminatory or was unstated 
(Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & Stangor, 2003). In another study, researchers both measured 
and manipulated whether participants believed their own implicit bias against gay people was 
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intentional or not (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips, 2014). Those who perceived their own implicit 
bias to be intentional exhibited more explicit homophobia and their implicit and explicit biases 
against gay people were more strongly related. These two findings suggest that perceiving more 
intent results in perceiving more prejudice in an incident and, with respect to one’s own 
behavior, also yields more explicit bias.  
There are a couple of studies that have examined the effect of information about a 
perpetrator’s implicit bias on perpetrator blame (Cameron, Payne, & Knobe, 2010; Redford & 
Ratliff, 2013).  In these studies, the vignettes do not directly use the term “implicit bias” but 
instead manipulate the description of a perpetrator’s negative racial attitudes to better understand 
how people incorporate that information in their evaluations of that person and their behavior. 
For example, when discrimination against African-Americans was committed by a White person 
whose racial bias was attributed to negative attitudes that operate outside of conscious 
awareness, which he did not know about and thus could not control, he was blamed less than 
when his racial bias was attributed to automatic negative attitudes that he knew about but could 
not control, or not attributed to anything (Cameron, Payne, & Knobe, 2010). Similarly, setting 
aside the control aspect and replicating the previous finding, participants were more likely to 
blame a White person who discriminated against African Americans because of his unconscious 
negative attitudes if he was aware of the unconscious negativity than if he was unaware of his 
unconscious negativity (Redford & Ratliff, 2013). This work suggests that if a perpetrator does 
not have knowledge of or is unaware of their bias, as is purported to be the case with implicit 
bias, this can decrease their blame for discrimination that they perpetrate.  
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The Present Research  
As mentioned earlier, a distinction can be made between intention, the decision to act, 
and the intentionality of an action (Malle & Knobe, 1997). In the context of discriminatory 
behavior that is attributed to implicit bias, a perpetrator’s intention to discriminate is not clear 
because their true beliefs or desires about their action’s discriminatory effect might be 
ambiguous, unstated, or explicitly nondiscriminatory. With respect to the intentionality of a 
discriminatory action, implicit bias does not affect one’s ability to discriminate, but because it 
operates outside conscious awareness, implicit bias can call into question a perpetrator’s 
awareness that their action is discriminatory and thus, the intentionality of a perpetrators’ 
discriminatory action. This suggests an unexpected negative consequence of connecting 
discrimination to implicit bias: perceiving reduced intent. As a result, the first prediction tested in 
this investigation is that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias (relative to explicit bias or 
offering no information) will reduce perceived intent. With this three-cell design, these 
experiments allow us to test the effect of implicit bias framing compared to no information, the 
effect of implicit bias framing itself, and the effect of implicit bias framing compared to explicit 
bias framing, the difference between one option for framing racial bias and another. Both 
comparisons provide useful information about how to understand implicit bias framing. 
As discussed, conscious awareness is a major distinction between conceptions of explicit 
and implicit bias (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Second, awareness of bias leads individuals to be 
more likely to consider subtle instances of discrimination racist (Perry et al., 2015) and when 
observers believe that another person has awareness of their bias they perceive that this person 
exhibits more intent to discriminate (Cameron et al., 2010; Redford & Ratliff, 2013). In addition, 
extant research suggests that the more intent that is perceived in an incident of discrimination, 
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the more observers will perceive that the incident is prejudiced, harmful, blameworthy, and the 
more observers will support punishing the perpetrator. Thus, the second prediction is that 
perceived intent will mediate the relationship between racial bias framing and evaluations of the 
discriminatory incident.  
Across three studies, I test the prediction that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias 
(relative to explicit bias or offering no information) will negatively impact evaluations of the 
severity of discrimination by changing perceptions of intent. This prediction is tested in three 
different contexts: with respect to a mundane racial hassle (Study 1), a more harmful racial 
incident (Study 2), and an incident where the perpetrator expresses biased beliefs about African 
Americans (Study 3). In a Study 4, I experimentally manipulate the proposed mediator, 
perceived intent, to provide additional evidence that perceived intent is mechanism by which 
framing racial bias as rooted in implicit bias affects perceptions of the severity of discriminatory 
incidents.  
 
CHAPTER 2: Experiment 1  
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to provide an initial test of whether framing racial bias in 
terms of implicit bias will lead to evaluations of a discriminatory incident that are less severe 
than when racial bias is framed in terms of explicit bias, or when no information about racial bias 
is provided. In particular, Experiment 1 explored White respondents’ evaluations of a form of 
everyday discrimination directed toward African-Americans: the presumption that they do not 
belong in a particular environment.  
For Experiment 1, there are three specific predictions: (1) when racial bias is framed in 
terms of implicit bias, participants will report that the perpetrator exhibited less intent than when 
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racial bias is framed in terms of explicit bias, or when no information is provided; (2) when 
racial bias is framed in terms of implicit bias, participants will report less racism, offensiveness, 
harm, blame, and will display less support for punishment of the perpetrator than when racial 
bias is framed in terms of explicit bias, or when no information is provided; and (3) the perceived 
intent of the perpetrator will mediate the relationship between how bias is framed and the 
outcomes measured.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using an online platform hosted at a public 
university and paid $2 for their participation. Two hundred and eighty-nine White undergraduate 
students (69 men, 217 women, 3 unidentified; Mage = 23, SD = 5.75) completed the study.  
Design and procedure. This study had a 3 cell (Racial Bias Framing: control, implicit 
bias, explicit bias) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition.  
First, participants were told that they would be given a summary of one of three randomly 
selected newspaper articles about one of three topics: the environment, education policy, or 
discrimination. Participants in the implicit and explicit bias conditions read that, for context, they 
would be provided with definitions of key terms regarding each of the potential articles. The key 
term for the article about the environment was “global warming.” The definition given was: 
“Global warming is the recent increase in the world's temperature that is believed to be caused by 
the increase of certain gases (such as carbon dioxide) in the atmosphere.” The key term for the 
article about education policy was “the Common Core.” The definition given was: “The 
Common Core is a set of high-quality academic standards in mathematics and English language 
arts/literacy (ELA). These learning goals outline what a student should know and be able to do at 
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the end of each grade.” The definitions of these terms were the same in the both experimental 
conditions. Participants in the control condition did not receive any of these definitions and 
skipped directly to reading the summary of the article. 
The key term for the discrimination article was “racial bias” and the definition was the 
focal experimental manipulation of racial bias framing. Participants in the implicit bias condition 
read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be implicit, meaning it is caused by 
unconscious negative stereotypes and can lead to discrimination. 
 
Participants in the explicit bias condition read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be explicit, meaning it is caused by conscious 
negative stereotypes and can lead to discrimination. 
 
All participants were assigned to read the article on discrimination. After learning this, 
participants were given the definition of racial bias again and asked to type the definition in a 
box on the same page. The article included bullets regarding the main details of the story: 
• Jamal Barkley, a 40-year-old Black man living in Oakland, 
California, recently experienced an alleged incident of 
racial discrimination.  
• Jamal, dressed casually in a hoodie and sweatpants, went to 
Birchwood Café to meet his wife, Lisa, who was White, 
and some of her friends, who were also White. While he 
was standing and chatting with them, an employee tapped 
him on the shoulder.  
• When Barkley turned around, the employee glared at him 
and asked him to leave, assuming that he was harassing the 
women and trying to sell them something. Barkley was 
humiliated and upset.  
After reading about the incident, participants answered the focal dependent variables. 
Perceptions of intent. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s intent to discriminate 
against the Black patron were measured using five items: “To what extent do you believe the 
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employee’s treatment of Jamal was intentionally discriminatory?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee meant to treat Jamal poorly because of his race?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee tries to treat all patrons fairly regardless of race?” (R), “To what extent do 
you believe the employee’s treatment of Jamal was intentionally harmful?,” and “To what extent 
do you believe the employee wanted to harm Jamal?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert 
scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
perceiving more intent on the part of the perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.85).  
Perceptions of racism. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s racism were measured 
using three items: “To what extent do you believe the incident was racist?,” “To what extent do 
you believe the employee’s action was a mistake anyone could have made?” (R), and “To what 
extent do you believe the employee holds negative attitudes toward African-Americans?” 
Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  Items were 
recoded such that higher numbers indicate perceiving more racism on the part of the perpetrator 
of the discriminatory incident (α=.76). 
Offensiveness of the employee’s behavior. Participants’ beliefs that the employee’s 
behavior was offensive were measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe that the 
White employee’s actions were offensive?,” “To what extent do you believe that the White 
employee’s actions were disrespectful?,” “To what extent do you believe that the White 
employee’s actions were wrong?,” and “To what extent do you believe that the White 
employee’s actions were acceptable?” (R). Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= 
not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
offensiveness of the discriminatory behavior (α=.90). 
Perceptions of harm. Participants’ perceptions of the harm done to the Black patron were 
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measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe that Jamal was harmed by the 
employee’s actions?,” “To what extent do you believe that the incident was embarrassing to 
Jamal?,” To what extent do you believe that the incident was humiliating to Jamal?,” and “To 
what extent do you believe that the incident was painful to Jamal?” Responses were made using 
7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers 
indicate perceiving more harm resulting from the discriminatory incident (α=.86). 
Perceptions of blame and responsibility.  Participants’ perceptions of blame and 
responsibility were measured using four items adapted from two moral psychology papers 
examining similar topics (Ames & Fiske, 2013; Cameron et al, 2010). Participants indicated their 
agreement or disagreement with 4 statements: “The employee deserves blame for the incident,” 
“The employee should be morally condemned for the incident,” “The employee is morally 
responsible for his treatment of Jamal,” and “The employee should not be held accountable for 
his treatment of Jamal” (reverse coded). Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate 
more blame of the perpetrator (α=.86). 
Support for punishment. Participants indicated their support for punishment of the 
employee using one item, “The employee should be punished for his treatment of Jamal.” 
Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). 
Demographics. Participants indicated their gender, race, and age. 
Results  
In all studies reported in this paper, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used 
to explore differences between conditions on focal dependent variables. Those analyses were 
followed by planned contrasts comparing the implicit bias framing condition to the control 
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condition and to the explicit bias framing condition. Participants’ perceived intent, perceived 
racism, offensiveness of the discrimination, harm, blame, and support for punishment for the 
discriminatory incident were examined as a function of whether racial bias was framed in terms 
of implicit bias, explicit bias, or was not mentioned, in the control condition. Finally, mediation 
analyses were conducted to test the proposed mechanism, perceived intent. Perceived intent was 
predicted to explain the relationship between the way racial bias is framed and responses to the 
discriminatory incident.  Descriptives and inter-item correlations are shown in Table 1.   
Table 1  
Experiment 1 Descriptives and Correlations 
 M SD Perceived Intent 
Perceived 
Racism 
Perceived 
Offensiveness 
Perceived 
Harm 
Perpetrator 
blame 
Support for 
Punishment 
Perceived 
Intent 4.08 1.19 -      
Perceived 
Racism 5.46 1.15 .58** -     
Perceived 
Offensiveness 5.99 1.06 .51** .77** -    
Perceived 
Harm 5.99 1.01 .36** .54** .60** -   
Perpetrator 
blame 5.25 1.16 .57** .65** .69** .46** -  
Support for 
Punishment 4.11 1.57 .52** .56** .54** .35** .76** - 
Note: **p < .01 
Perceptions of intent. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias framing 
on participants’ perceptions of the perpetrator’s intent to discriminate was significant, F(2, 286) 
= 4.78, p = 0.009, hp2 = 0.032 (see Figure 1). Consistent with predictions, planned contrasts 
revealed that participants in the implicit bias condition (M = 3.81, SD = 1.17) perceived less 
intent than participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 4.32, SD = 1.17, t(286) = -3.042, p = 
0.003). Similarly, participants in implicit bias condition perceived less intent than participants in 
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the control condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.18), although this difference was marginally statistically 
significant, t(286) = 1.944, p = 0.053.  
 
Figure 1. Whites perceptions of the intent in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 1). 
 
Perceptions of racism. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias 
framing on perceptions of racism was trending toward significance, F(2, 286) = 2.04, p = 0.132, 
hp2 = 0.014 (see Figure 2).  
Consistent with predictions, planned contrasts revealed that participants in the implicit 
bias condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.27) perceived less racism than participants in the explicit bias 
condition (M = 6.07, SD = 1.01, t(286) = -2.017, p = 0.045). There was no significant difference 
in perceived racism between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.46, SD = 1.12) conditions, 
although the means were in the predicted direction, t(286) = 1.038, p = 0.300. 
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Figure 2. Whites perceptions of the racism in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 1) 
 
Offensiveness of the discrimination. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias 
framing did not have a significant effect on offensiveness, F(2, 286) = 1.191, p = 0.306, hp2 = 
0.008. Planned contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the implicit 
bias condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.17) perceived the behavior to be more acceptable than 
participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 6.07, SD = 0.91), although this difference was not 
statistically significant, t(286) = -1.385, p = 0.167). There was also no significant difference in 
offensiveness of the behavior between the implicit bias and control (M = 6.05, SD = 1.08, t(286) 
= 1.263, p = 0.208) conditions, although again, the means were in the predicted direction. 
Perceptions of harm. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not have 
a significant effect on perceptions of harm, F(2, 286) = 0.171, p = 0.843, hp2 = 0.001). Planned 
contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. There was no significant difference 
between perceived harm in the implicit bias condition (M = 5.94, SD = 1.09) and the explicit bias 
condition (M = 6.03, SD = 0.87), t(286) = -0.577, p = 0.565. There was also no significant 
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difference in perceived harm of the behavior between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.99, SD 
= 1.050) conditions, t(286) = 0.367, p = 0.714. 
Perceptions of blame. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on perceptions of blame, F(2, 286) = 1.262, p = 0.285, hp2 = 0.009). 
Planned contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the implicit bias 
condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.25) perceived the behavior to be less blameworthy than participants 
in the explicit bias condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.11), although this difference was not statistically 
significant, t(286) = -1.409, p = 0.160). There was also no significant difference in blame 
between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.32, SD = 1.09), conditions, although again, the 
means were in the predicted direction, t(286) = 1.282, p = 0.201. 
Support for punishment. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on support for punishment, F(2, 285) = 0.154,  p = 0.857, hp2 = 0.001). 
Planned contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. There was no significant 
difference between perceived harm in the implicit bias condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.54) and the 
explicit bias (M = 4.17, SD = 1.69) condition, t(285) = -0.228, p = 0.820. There was also no 
significant difference in support for punishment between the implicit bias and control (M = 4.04, 
SD = 1. 47), conditions, t(285) = -0.335, p = 0.738. 
Mediation analyses. Despite the fact that racial bias framing did not exert a statistically 
significant effect on the measured outcomes, that requirement is not necessary for testing for 
mediation (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & 
Petty, 2011; Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Given that the prediction that 
perceived intent would mediate the relationship between racial bias framing and perceptions of 
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the discriminatory incident, mediation analyses were conducted to test this prediction (see Table 
2).  
Table 2  
Experiment 1 Indirect Effect of Implicit Bias Framing on Perceived Racism, Offensiveness, 
Harm, Blame, and Support for Punishment Through Perceived Intent  
Contrast Indirect Effect Bootstrapped Standard Error 
Bias-Corrected 
Lower Limit 
Bias-Corrected 
Upper Limit 
Outcome = Perceived Racism 
Contrast 1 .18 .10 -.00 .38 
Contrast 2 .28 .10 .12 .49 
Outcome = Perceived Offensiveness 
Contrast 1 .15 .08 .00 .32 
Contrast 2 .23 .09 .09 .42 
Outcome = Perceived Harm 
Contrast 1 .10 .06 .00 .23 
Contrast 2 .16 .06 .06 .31 
Outcome = Perpetrator blame 
Contrast 1 .18 .10 .00 .40 
Contrast 2 .28 .10 .11 .49 
Outcome = Support for Punishment 
Contrast 1 .23 .12 .00 .49 
Contrast 2 .37 .13 .13 .63 
Note. Contrast 1 = implicit bias condition compared to control condition; Contrast 2 = implicit 
bias condition compared to explicit bias condition. Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Significant indirect effects (p < .05) are highlighted in 
boldface.  
Given that the predictor (i.e., racial bias framing condition) was a categorical variable 
with three levels, I created two dummy-coded variables to conduct the mediation analysis (Hayes 
& Preacher, 2014) with the implicit bias framing condition as the reference group. Specifically, 
Contrast 1 tested the effect of the implicit bias framing (coded 0) versus the no bias framing 
(coded 1) condition, with the explicit bias framing condition coded 0. Contrast 2 tested for the 
residual difference between the implicit bias framing (coded 0) and the explicit bias framing 
(coded 1) conditions, with the no bias framing condition coded 0. This process was used for each 
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outcome measured in the study. The results for Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control 
condition) will be reported first, followed by the results for Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. 
explicit bias condition).  
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
racism. Consistent with the univariate analyses reported above, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., 
implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived intent was marginally significant, b = .328, SE = 
.169, p = .053. Though not statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to perceived 
racism, b = .170, SE = .164, p = .300. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts 
were entered simultaneously in the model predicting perceived racism, the effect of perceived 
intent was significant, b = .554, SE = .047, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., 
implicit bias vs. control condition) was reduced, b = -.011, SE = .136, p = .934.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.18, SE = .10) was calculated using a bootstrapping technique (Hayes, 2013; Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008). The null hypothesis of no mediation can be rejected when the confidence 
interval of the indirect effect does not include 0. In the present analyses, the confidence interval 
(with 5,000 resamples) for the estimate of the indirect effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. 
control condition) on perceived racism did include 0, 95% CI [-.00, .38], suggesting that 
perceived intent does not mediate the relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias 
compared to control condition) and perceived racism. 
The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .510, SE = .168, p = .003. Contrast 2 was positively related to perceived 
racism, b = .329, SE = .163, p = .045. As mentioned above, when perceived intent and the two 
contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting perceived racism, the effect of 
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perceived intent was significant, b = .554, SE = .047, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 
2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was reduced, b = .047, SE = .137, p = .734.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.28, SE = .10) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived racism did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.12, .49], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived racism. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and 
offensiveness of discrimination. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control 
condition) on perceived intent was marginally significant, b = .328, SE = .169, p = .053. Though 
not statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to offensiveness, b = .192, SE = 
.152, p = .208. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting offensiveness, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .453, SE = .046, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. control condition) was reduced, b = .044, SE = .133, p = .742.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.15, SE = .08) was calculated. The null hypothesis of no mediation can be rejected 
when the confidence interval of the indirect effect does not include 0. In the present analyses, the 
confidence interval (with 5,000 resamples) for the estimate of the indirect effect of Contrast 1 
(i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on offensiveness did not include 0, 95% CI [.00, .32], 
supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship between the racial bias 
framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and offensiveness. 
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The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .510, SE = .168, p = .003. Though not statistically significant, Contrast 2 was 
positively related to offensiveness, b = .209, SE = .151, p = .167. As mentioned above, when 
perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
offensiveness, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .453, SE = .046, p < .001. 
Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was reduced, b 
= -.022, SE = .133, p = .872.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.23, SE = .09) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on offensiveness did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.09, .42], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and offensiveness. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
harm. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived intent 
was marginally significant, b = .328, SE = .169, p = .053. Though the effect is small and not 
statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to perceived harm, b = .053, SE = .145, 
p = .714. When perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model 
predicting perceived harm, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .311, SE = .048, p < 
.001. The effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) was reduced and the sign 
was flipped, b = -.049, SE = .133, p = .742.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.10, SE = .06) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
  26 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived harm did not include 0, 
95% CI [.00, .23], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived 
harm. 
The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .510, SE = .168, p = .003. Contrast 2 also has a small, non-statistically 
significant positive effect on perceived harm, b = .083, SE = .144, p = .565. As mentioned above, 
when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
perceived harm, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .311, SE = .048, p < .001. 
Finally, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was reduced and 
the sign was flipped, b = -.076, SE = .137, p = .582.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.16, SE = .06) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived harm did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.06, .31], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived harm. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perpetrator 
blame. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived 
intent was marginally significant, b = .328, SE = .169, p = .053. Though the effect is not 
statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to perpetrator blame, b = .213, SE = 
.166, p = .201. When perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the 
model predicting perpetrator blame, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .556, SE = 
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.048, p < .001. The effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) was reduced, b = 
.031, SE = .139, p = .823.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.18, SE = .10) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perpetrator blame did not include 
0, 95% CI [.00, .40], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the difference between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control 
condition) and perpetrator blame. 
The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .510, SE = .168, p = .003. Though not significant, Contrast 2 has a positive 
effect on perpetrator blame, b = .238, SE = .165, p = .151. As mentioned above, when perceived 
intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting perpetrator 
blame, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .556, SE = .048, p < .001. Finally, the 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was reduced, b = -.046, SE = 
.139, p = .744.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.28, SE = .10) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perpetrator blame did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.11, .49], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perpetrator blame. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and support for 
punishment. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on 
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perceived intent was marginally significant, b = .328, SE = .169, p = .053. Unexpectedly, 
Contrast 1 was not related to support for punishment, b = .076, SE = .227, p = .738. When 
perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
support for punishment, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .707, SE = .068, p < 
.001. Interestingly, Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) is now negatively, though 
not statistically significantly, related to support for punishment, b = -.308, SE = .194, p = .114.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.23, SE = .12) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on support for punishment did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.00, .49], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and 
support for punishment. 
The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .510, SE = .168, p = .003. Unexpectedly, Contrast 2 was also not related to 
support for punishment, b = .051, SE = .226, p = .820. As mentioned above, when perceived 
intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting support for 
punishment, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .707, SE = .068, p < .001. Of note, 
Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was now negatively, though not 
statistically significantly, related to support for punishment, b = -.316, SE = .196, p = .107.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.37, SE = .13) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on support for punishment did 
not include 0, 95% CI [.13, .63], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
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relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and support for punishment. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 confirm my first and central prediction that framing racial 
bias as rooted in implicit bias reduces White respondents’ perceptions of the intent exhibited by 
perpetrators of discrimination. In addition, the results confirm my third prediction that perceived 
intent will mediate the relationship between the way racial bias is framed and the measured 
outcomes variables—perceived racism, offensiveness of the discrimination, perceived harm, 
perpetrator blame, and support for punishment. Whether the framing of racial bias as implicit 
bias was compared to no mention of racial bias or to the framing of racial bias as explicit bias, 
exposure to information about implicit bias reduced perceived intent, which reduced evaluations 
of the severity of the discrimination. The manipulation of racial bias framing did not exert a 
consistent effect on the dependent variables directly, rendering my second prediction 
unsupported. The effect of implicit bias framing on perceived racism was trending in 
significance but the effect on the other dependent variables were not statistically significant.  
One limitation of this experiment is that the mundane nature of the discriminatory 
incident and the lack of lasting harm to the target of the discrimination could have made it easy 
to shift participants’ perceptions of intent. One way to address this issue is to expose participants 
to an incident of discrimination that is less commonplace and that results in more harm done to 
the target. Consequently, Experiment 2 addresses this limitation by using a vignette featuring a 
discriminatory incident that is both less common and more harmful for the target.  
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CHAPTER 3: Experiment 2  
Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that framing discrimination in terms of implicit 
bias can affect White respondents’ perceptions of the intent of a person who commits an act of 
discrimination. The data also provided evidence that perceived intent is a mechanism through 
which information about implicit bias can undermine evaluations of incidents of discrimination. 
These findings stand in contrast to the purpose of informing people about implicit bias, which is 
to make people aware so that they might be more vigilant about discrimination, especially subtle 
forms.  
The discriminatory incident described in Experiment 1 is a mundane form of bias. 
Although it was embarrassing, the harm to the target is not beyond what an African-American 
might commonly encounter. Perhaps in such a situation, perceptions of intent and evaluations of 
the incident are easily undermined because the harm is not severe. To address this, Experiment 2 
aims to replicate these effects in a context where bias has the potential for more deadly 
consequences—contact with the police. In addition, Experiment 2 utilizes a different 
manipulation of racial bias framing, in a manner that better approximates the way participants 
might encounter this information in daily life. In Experiment 2, participants were presented with 
a more realistic version of the newspaper article, as opposed to the plain text summary of an 
article used in Experiment 1. This allowed a more direct framing of the incident of 
discrimination with implicit bias or explicit bias information, and to test how evaluations of the 
incident changed depending on the framing of racial bias. In Experiment 2 I anticipated that, 
replicating Experiment 1, the framing of racial bias would affect the perceived intent of the 
perpetrators of the discriminatory incident. Specifically, when racial bias is framed in terms of 
implicit bias, participants will perceive that the perpetrator exhibited less intent to discriminate 
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than when racial bias is framed in terms of explicit bias, or when no information is provided. In 
addition, replicating Experiment 1, I predicted that the perceived intent will mediate the 
relationship between racial bias framing and the outcomes measured in this study.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using an online platform hosted at a public 
university and paid $2 for their participation. One hundred and fifty-six White undergraduate 
students (31 men, 125 women; Mage = 26, SD = 11.69) completed the study.  
Design and procedure. This study had a 3 cell (Racial Bias Framing: Control, Implicit 
Bias, Explicit Bias) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition.  
 In this study, the racial bias framing manipulation and discriminatory vignette were 
embedded in one article, ostensibly from Psychology Today (See Figures 3-5).  The vignette was 
about a police shooting that resulted from mistaken identity.  
To reinforce the manipulation, participants were asked to complete two items on the same 
page as the article they read. In the racial bias conditions, participants were asked to complete the 
sentence in the article that featured the manipulated definition of racial bias, by typing out the 
end of the sentence in a box. The sentence started “The racial attitudes of White Americans in 
particular…” and was to be completed in the implicit bias condition with “are thought of as 
implicit and unconsciously held” and in the explicit bias condition with “are thought of as 
explicit and consciously held.” Participants in the control condition were asked to complete the 
sentence, “Psychologists have long been interested in…” with “interactions between police and 
civilians.” 
Participants were also asked to select the word out of three listed options that completed a 
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sentence from the article. The sentence in the racial bias conditions was “People tend to have a 
________ implicit/explicit bias against African Americans.” The options were “Slight,” 
“Moderate,” and “Strong” and the correct answer was “Moderate.”  The sentence in the control 
condition was “Dr. George Medin argued that it should be a ________ for psychologists to study 
these types of encounters between police and civilians.” The options were “Requirement,” 
“Priority,” and “Last resort” and the correct answer was “Priority.” 
After reading the article and answering the questions, participants answered questions 
assessing perceived intent, racism, offensiveness of the perpetrators’ behavior, blame, harm, and 
support for punishment. 
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Figure 3. Psychology Today article used in the implicit bias condition. 
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Figure 4. Psychology Today article used in the explicit bias condition. 
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Figure 5. Psychology Today article used in the control condition. 
 
Perceptions of intent. Participants’ perceptions of the officers’ intent to discriminate 
against the Black target were measured using five items: “To what extent do you believe the 
officers’ treatment of Lamar was intentionally discriminatory?,” “To what extent do you believe 
the officers meant to treat Lamar poorly because of his race?,” “To what extent do you believe 
the officer tries to treat all civilians fairly regardless of race?,” “To what extent do you believe 
the officers’ treatment of Lamar was intentionally harmful?,” and “To what extent do you 
believe the officers wanted to harm Lamar?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales 
(1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
perceiving more intent on the part of the perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.86).  
Perceptions of racism. Participants’ perceptions of the officers’ racism were measured 
using three items: “To what extent do you believe the incident was racist,” “To what extent do 
you believe the officers’ action was a mistake anyone could have made” (R), and “To what 
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extent do you believe the officers hold negative attitudes toward African-Americans?” 
Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  Items were 
recoded such that higher numbers indicate more perceiving more racism on the part of the 
perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.79).  
Offensiveness of the discrimination. Participants’ perceptions of the offensiveness of the 
discrimination were measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe that the officers’ 
actions were offensive?,” “To what extent do you believe that the officers’ actions were 
disrespectful?,” “To what extent do you believe that the officers’ actions were wrong?,” and “To 
what extent do you believe that the officers’ actions were acceptable?” (R). Responses were 
made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that 
higher numbers indicate more perceiving that the discriminatory incident was more offensive 
(α=.89).  
Perceptions of harm. Participants’ perceptions of the harm done to Lamar were 
measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe that Lamar was harmed by the 
officers’ actions?,” “To what extent do you believe that the incident was embarrassing to 
Lamar?,” To what extent do you believe that the incident was humiliating to Lamar?,” and “To 
what extent do you believe that the incident was painful to Lamar?” Responses were made using 
7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers 
indicate more perceiving more harm resulting from the discriminatory incident (α=.82).  
Perceptions of blame and responsibility.  Participants’ perceptions of blame and 
responsibility were measured using the four items used in previous studies and adapted from 
Ames & Fiske, 2013 and Cameron et al, 2010. Participants indicated their agreement or 
disagreement with 4 statements: “The officers deserve blame for the incident,” “The officers 
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should be morally condemned for the incident,” “The officers are morally responsible for their 
treatment of Lamar,” and “The officers should not be held accountable for their treatment of 
Lamar” (reverse coded). Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
perceiving more blame of the perpetrator (α=.86).  
Support for punishment. Participants indicated their support for punishment of the 
officers using one item, “The officers should be punished for their treatment of Lamar.” 
Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). 
Demographics. Participants indicated their gender, race, and age. 
Results  
As in Experiment 1, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to explore 
differences between conditions on focal dependent variables. Those analyses were followed by 
planned contrasts comparing the implicit bias framing condition to the control and to the explicit 
bias framing conditions. Participants’ perceived intent, racism, offensiveness of the 
discrimination, harm, blame, and support for punishment for the discriminatory incident were 
examined as a function of whether racial bias was framed in terms of implicit bias, explicit bias, 
or not mentioned, in the control condition. Finally, mediation analyses were conducted to test the 
proposed mechanism, perceived intent. Perceived intent was predicted to explain the relationship 
between the way racial bias is framed and perceptions of the discriminatory incidents.  
Descriptives and inter-item correlations are shown in Table 3.   
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Table 3 
Experiment 2 Descriptives and Correlations 
 M SD Perceived Intent 
Perceived 
Racism 
Perceived 
Offensiveness 
Perceived 
Harm 
Perpetrator 
blame 
Support for 
Punishment 
Perceived 
Intent 3.91 1.30 -      
Perceived 
Racism 5.05 1.55 .63** -     
Perceived 
Offensiveness 5.55 1.33 .53** .77** -    
Perceived 
Harm 6.20 0.97 .28** .41** .51** -   
Perpetrator 
blame 5.47 1.26 .60** .72** .81** .49** -  
Support for 
Punishment 5.32 1.54 .53** .62** .75** .41** .85** - 
Note: **p < .01 
Perceptions of intent. A one-way ANOVA revealed that, consistent with predictions, 
racial bias framing had a significant effect on perceptions of intent, F(2, 153) = 4.23, p = 0.016, 
hp2 = 0.052 (see Figure 6).  
This analysis was followed by planned contrasts comparing the implicit bias condition to 
the explicit bias condition and to the control condition. Participants in the implicit bias condition 
(M = 3.56, SD = 1.24) perceived less intent than participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 
4.28, SD = 1.24; t(153) = -2.901, p = 0.004). Participants in the implicit bias condition also 
perceived less intent than participants in the control bias condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.34), but 
this difference was trending in statistical significance, t(153) = 1.551, p = 0.123.  
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Figure 6. Whites perceptions of the intent in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 2). 
 
Perceptions of racism. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias 
framing on perceptions of racism was not significant, F(2, 153) = 0.641, p = 0.528, hp2 = 0.008. 
Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. There was no 
significant difference in perceived racism between the implicit bias condition (M = 4.75, SD = 
1.34) and the explicit bias condition (M = 5.02, SD = 1.19), t(153) = -1.039, p = 0.300. There 
was also no significant difference in perceived racism between the implicit bias and control (M = 
4.78, SD = 1.43) conditions, t(153) = .102, p = 0.919. 
Offensiveness of the discrimination. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias 
framing did not have a significant effect on offensiveness, F(2, 153) = 1.306, p = 0.274, hp2 = 
0.017. Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. Participants in 
the implicit bias condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.44) perceived the behavior to be less offensive than 
participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 5.77, SD = 1.17), though this difference was only 
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marginally statistically significant, t(153) = -1.616, p = 0.108. There was no difference in 
offensiveness of the behavior between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.55, SD = 1.43), 
conditions, although the means were in the predicted direction, t(153) = 0.776, p = 0.439. 
Perceptions of harm. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing exerted a 
marginally significant effect on perceptions of harm, F(2, 153) = 2.448, p = 0.090, hp2 = 0.031 
(see Figure 7).  
Consistent with predictions, planned contrasts revealed that participants in the implicit 
bias condition (M = 5.97, SD = 1.12) perceived less harm than participants in the explicit bias 
condition (M = 6.37, SD = 0.72), t(153) = -2.113, p = 0.036. Participants in the implicit bias 
condition also perceived less harm than participants in the control condition (M = 6.27, SD = 
0.98), although this difference was marginally significant, t(153) = 1.588, p = 0.114. 
 
Figure 7. Whites perceptions of the harm in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 2). 
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Perceptions of blame. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on perceptions of blame, F(2, 153) = 1.665, p = 0.193, hp2 = 0.021.  
Planned contrasts revealed that participants perceived less blame in the implicit bias 
condition (M = 5.25, SD = 1.27) than in the explicit bias condition (M = 5.69, SD = 1.11), 
although this difference was marginally statistically significant, t(153) = -1.816, p = 0.071. There 
was no significant difference in perceived intent between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.50, 
SD = 1.36) conditions, although the means were in the predicted direction, t(153) = 1.025, p = 
0.307. 
Support for punishment. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on support for punishment, F(2, 153) = 0.759, p = 0.470, hp2 = 0.010. 
Planned contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the implicit bias 
condition (M = 5.13, SD = 1.59) supported less punishment than participants in the explicit bias 
condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.42), t(151) = -1.226, p = 0.222, but this difference was not 
statistically significant. Similarly, participants in implicit bias condition supported less 
punishment than participants in the control condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.60), and this difference 
was also not statistically significant, t(151) = 0.696, p = 0.487.  
Mediation analyses. As in Experiment 1, mediation analyses were conducted to test 
whether perceived intent mediated the relationship between racial bias framing and evaluations 
of the discriminatory incident (see Table 4). Given that the predictor (i.e., condition) was a 
categorical variable with three levels, I created two dummy-coded variables to conduct the 
mediation analysis with the implicit bias framing condition as the reference group. Specifically, 
Contrast 1 tested the effect of the implicit bias framing (coded 0) versus the no bias framing 
(coded 1) condition, with the explicit bias framing condition coded 0. Contrast 2 tested for the 
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residual difference between the implicit bias framing (coded 0) and the explicit bias framing 
(coded 1) conditions, with the no bias framing condition coded 0. This process was used for each 
outcome measured in the study. The results for Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias 
condition) will be reported first, followed by the results for Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. 
control condition). 
Table 4 
Experiment 2 Indirect Effect of Implicit Bias Framing on Perceived Racism, Offensiveness, 
Harm, Blame, and Support for Punishment Through Perceived Intent  
Contrast Indirect Effect Bootstrapped Standard Error 
Bias-Corrected 
Lower Limit 
Bias-Corrected 
Upper Limit 
Outcome = Perceived Racism 
Contrast 1 .27 .18 -.07 .63 
Contrast 2 .51 .18 .18 .88 
Outcome = Perceived Offensiveness 
Contrast 1 .21 .14 -.05 .49 
Contrast 2 .39 .15 .14 .71 
Outcome = Perceived Harm 
Contrast 1 .07 .06 -.01 .23 
Contrast 2 .14 .07 .03 .32 
Outcome = Perpetrator blame 
Contrast 1 .22 .115 -.05 .55 
Contrast 2 .42 .15 .13 .74 
Outcome = Support for Punishment 
Contrast 1 .24 .16 -.06 .59 
Contrast 2 .48 .17 .18 .86 
Note. Contrast 1 = implicit bias condition compared to control condition; Contrast 2 = implicit 
bias condition compared to explicit bias condition. Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Significant indirect effects (p < .05) are highlighted in 
boldface.  
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
racism. Consistent with the univariate analyses reported above, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., 
implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived intent was not significant, b = .385, SE = .248, p 
= .123. Contrast 1 was not related to perceived racism, b = .026, SE = .257, p = .919. However, 
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when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
perceived racism, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .699, SE = .062, p < .001. 
Interestingly, a negative effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on 
perceived racism emerged, though this effect was not statistically significant, b = -.243, SE = 
.192, p = .207.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect for 
Contrast 1 (.27, SE = .18) was calculated. The null hypothesis of no mediation can be rejected 
when the confidence interval of the indirect effect does not include 0. In the present analyses, the 
confidence interval (with 5,000 resamples) for the estimate of the indirect effect of Contrast 1 
(i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived racism included 0, 95% CI [-.07, .63] 
suggesting that perceived intent does not mediate the relationship between the racial bias framing 
(implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived racism. 
 Conversely, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was statistically significant, b = .724, SE = .250, p = .004. Contrast 2 was 
positively related to perceived racism, b = .269, SE = .258, p = .301, although this effect was not 
statistically significant. As mentioned above, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were 
entered simultaneously in the model predicting perceived racism, the effect of perceived intent 
was significant, b = .699, SE = .062, p < .001. Interestingly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit 
bias vs. explicit bias condition) remained statistically insignificant but the sign on the coefficient 
flipped, b = -.238, SE = .197, p = .228.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.51, SE = .18) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived racism did not 
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include 0, 95% CI [.18, .88], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived racism. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
offensiveness of discrimination. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control 
condition) on perceived intent was not significant, b = .385, SE = .248, p = .123. Contrast 1 was 
positively related to offensiveness of the discrimination, b = .201, SE = .259, p = .439, though 
this effect was not statistically significant. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two 
contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting offensiveness of the 
discrimination, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .552, SE = .072, p < .001. 
Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 was eliminated, b = -.008, SE = .223, p = .973. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.21, SE = .14) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on offensiveness of the 
discrimination included 0, 95% CI [-.05, .49], suggesting that perceived intent did not mediate 
the relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and 
offensiveness of the discrimination.  
Conversely, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was significant, b = .724, SE = .250, p = .004. Contrast 2 was positively related 
to offensiveness of the discrimination, although this effect was marginally statistically 
significant, b = .420, SE = .260, p = .108. As mentioned above, when perceived intent and the 
two contrasts were entered simultaneously into the model predicting offensiveness, the effect of 
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perceived intent was significant, b = .542, SE = .072, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 
2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was eliminated, b = .028, SE = .229, p = .902.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.39, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on offensiveness of the 
discrimination did not include 0, 95% CI [.14, .71], supporting my prediction that perceived 
intent mediates the relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to 
explicit bias condition) and offensiveness of the discrimination.  
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
harm. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived intent 
was not significant, b = .385, SE = .248, p = .123. Contrast 1 was positively related to perceived 
harm, although this difference was marginally statistically significant, b = .297, SE = .187, p = 
.115. When perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model 
predicting perceived harm, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .192, SE = .059, p < 
.001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived 
harm was reduced, b = .223, SE = .183, p = .224. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.07, SE = .06) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived harm included 0, 95% 
CI [-.01, .23], suggesting that perceived intent did not mediate the relationship between racial 
bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived harm. 
Conversely, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was significant, b = .724, SE = .250, p = .004. Contrast 2 was positively related 
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to perceived harm, b = .397, SE = .188, p = .036. As mentioned above, when perceived intent 
and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting perceived harm, the 
effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .192, SE = .059, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of 
Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was reduced, b = .259, SE = .19, p = 
.169.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.14, SE = .07) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived harm did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.03, .32], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived harm. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perpetrator 
blame. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived 
intent was not significant, b = .385, SE = .248, p = .123. Contrast 1 was positively related to 
perpetrator blame, although this effect was not statistically significant, b = .250, SE = .244, p = 
.307. When perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model 
predicting perpetrator blame, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .581, SE = .045, p 
< .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on 
perpetrator blame was eliminated, b = .026, SE = .198, p = .896. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.22, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perpetrator blame included 0, 
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95% CI [-.05, .55], suggesting that perceived intent does not mediate the relationship between 
the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived harm. 
 Conversely, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was significant, b = .724, SE = .250, p = .004. Contrast 2 was positively related 
to perpetrator blame, although this effect was marginally statistically significant, b = .445, SE = 
.245, p = .071. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting perpetrator blame, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .581, SE = .045, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. explicit bias condition) was eliminated, b = .024, SE = .203, p = .907.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.42, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived harm did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.13, .74], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing and perceived harm. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and support for 
punishment. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on 
perceived intent was not significant, b = .385, SE = .248, p = .123. Contrast 1 was positively 
related to support for punishment, although this effect was not statistically significant, b = .210, 
SE = .302, p = .487. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting support for punishment, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .641, SE = .084, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. control condition) was eliminated, b = -.029, SE = .260, p = .910. 
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To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.24, SE = .16) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on support for punishment included 
0, 95% CI [-.06, .59], suggesting that perceived intent does not mediate the relationship between 
the racial bias framing and support for punishment. 
 Conversely, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was significant, b = .724, SE = .250, p = .004. Contrast 2 was positively related 
to support for punishment, although this effect was not statistically significant, b = .370, SE = 
.302, p = .222. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting support for punishment, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .641, SE = .084, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. explicit bias condition) reduced and the sign on the coefficient flipped, b = -.113, SE = .265, 
p = .672.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.48, SE = .17) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on support for punishment did 
not include 0, 95% CI [.18, .86], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing and support for punishment. 
Discussion 
Consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 found that framing racial bias as rooted in 
implicit bias reduces White respondents’ perceptions of the intent exhibited by perpetrators of 
discrimination. In addition, the results also provided evidence that perceived intent mediated the 
relationship between the way racial bias is framed and the outcomes variables—perceived 
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racism, offensiveness of the discrimination, perceived harm, perpetrator blame, and support for 
punishment. This was the case when the framing of racial bias as rooted in implicit bias was 
compared to the framing of racial bias as rooted in explicit bias. In that comparison, exposure to 
implicit bias rather than explicit bias was related to reductions in perceived intent, which was in 
turn related to reductions in evaluations of the severity of the discrimination. When the framing 
of racial bias as implicit bias was compared to no mention of racial bias, there was not a 
significant difference in perceived intent and thus, no evidence of statistical mediation.  
As in Experiment 1, the manipulation did not exert a consistent effect on the dependent 
variables directly.  The effect of racial bias framing on perceived harm was marginally 
significant but the effect on the other dependent variables were not statistically significant. 
Ultimately though, a consistent pattern emerged across two different contexts—a more mundane 
instance of racial antagonism and a less common but more harmful instance.  
 
CHAPTER 4: Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 have provided evidence that framing racial bias in terms of implicit 
bias can undermine perceptions of the severity of incidents of discrimination—both mundane 
(Experiment 1) and deadly (Experiment 2) forms—through reducing perceived intent. 
Additionally, both studies provided evidence that perceptions of the perpetrator’s intent mediate 
the relationship between racial bias framing and the measured outcomes: perceived racism, 
offensiveness, harm, blame, and support for punishment. Although these findings are consistent 
with my hypotheses regarding the central role of intent, they emerged in contexts where the 
perpetrator did not express explicitly biased attitudes. That is, while Experiments 1 and 2 
featured scenarios that were discriminatory in their outcome, in both studies the racial attitudes 
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of the perpetrators were left unstated. It might be the case that framing racial bias as rooted in 
implicit bias would have a stronger effect if the incident included more overt racial content. The 
primary purpose of Experiment 3 is to directly examine this possibility. In addition, Experiment 
3 explores the effect of framing racial bias as rooted in implicit bias in a different context: a 
workplace interaction between a new employee and her manager. Experiment 3 also tests the 
effect of racial bias on blame of the victim of discrimination to allow for contrast to blame of the 
perpetrator of discrimination.  
In Experiment 3 I anticipated that, replicating the previous studies, the framing of racial 
bias would affect the perceived intent of perpetrators of discrimination. Specifically, when racial 
bias is framed in terms of implicit bias, participants will perceive that the perpetrator exhibited 
less intent to discriminate than when racial bias is framed in terms of explicit bias, or when no 
information is provided. In addition, replicating the earlier studies, I predicted that perceived 
intent will mediate the relationship between racial bias framing and the outcomes measured in 
this study.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid 
$0.40 for their participation. Two hundred and forty-one White adults (87 men, 153 women, 1 
unidentified; Mage = 38, SD =13.28) completed the study.  
Design and procedure. This study had a 3 cell (Racial Bias Framing: Control, Implicit 
Bias, Explicit Bias) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition.  
First, participants were told that they would be asked to read a report about workplace 
discrimination. Participants in the experimental conditions were then told they would be given a 
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definition to help them with their evaluation. Participants in the control condition did not receive 
any definition and skipped directly to reading the report of discrimination. As in Experiment 1, 
“racial bias” was defined for participants and the definition was the focal experimental 
manipulation of implicit bias framing. The same definitions from Experiment 1 were used. 
Participants in the implicit bias condition read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be implicit, meaning it is caused by 
unconscious negative stereotypes and can lead to discrimination. 
 
Participants in the explicit bias condition read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be explicit, meaning it is caused by conscious 
negative stereotypes and can lead to discrimination. 
 
After reading the definition, participants were asked to re-type the definition, to ensure 
that they read it. Then, all participants read a report about an instance of workplace 
discrimination adapted from examples of employment discrimination listed on the website of the 
human relations commission in a mid-sized city. 
After receiving a business degree, Naima, a 32-year-old African 
American woman, was hired as an entry-level associate in a cohort 
of several new hires. Initially, like other new associates, Naima 
received routine assignments. In addition, her performance 
evaluations from her assigning manager were similar to those 
given to other members of her cohort. 
  
But, as other associates became increasingly busy with complex, 
long-term projects, Naima noticed that she continued to receive 
projects that were short-term and routine. At her most recent 
performance review, her manager told Naima that, unlike the other 
members of her cohort, her performance did not meet the 
company’s high standards for number of billable hours and the 
revenue being brought in. As a result, she was in danger of being 
put on probation, which could lead to termination. The manager 
also mentioned that African American hires like Naima typically 
do not do well in the company. 
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Naima feels that the disparity between how she and her co-workers 
are allocated demanding work is, in part, because she is African 
American. Naima filed a racial discrimination claim for inequitable 
allocation of employment and advancement opportunities.   
 
The comment from the manager about African-Americans not doing well at the company 
was based on previous research detailing lay beliefs about the racism in different behaviors 
(Sommers & Norton, 2006). In that study, respondents rated “thinking Black people are not 
suited for certain professions” as about an 18 on a 21-point scale. After reading the report, 
participants answered the focal dependent variables. 
Perceptions of intent. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s intent to discriminate 
against the Black patron were measured using six items: “To what extent do you believe the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was intentionally discriminatory?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee meant to treat Naima poorly because of her race?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee tries to treat all employees fairly regardless of race?” (R), “To what extent 
do you believe the employee’s treatment of Naima was intentionally harmful?,” “To what extent 
do you believe the employee wanted to harm Jamal?,” and “To what extent do you believe the 
manager wanted to offend Naima?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at 
all, 7 = extremely).  Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more perceiving more 
intent on the part of the perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.89).  
Perceptions of racism. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s racism were measured 
using three items: “To what extent do you believe the manager’s treatment of Naima was 
racist?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager’s treatment of Naima was due to implicit 
bias?, and “To what extent do you believe the employee holds negative attitudes toward African-
Americans?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  
Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate perceiving more racism on the part of the 
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perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.76). 
Offensiveness of the manager’s behavior. Participants’ perceptions of the manager’s 
behavior as offensive were measured using seven items: “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was offensive?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was a problem?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was acceptable?” (R), “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was disrespectful?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was right?” (R), “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was wrong?,” and  “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was appropriate? (R). Responses were made using 7-point Likert 
scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
offensiveness of the discriminatory behavior (α=.95). 
Perceptions of harm. Participants’ perceptions of the harm done to the Black employee 
were measured using six items: “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was 
harmful?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was hurtful?,” “To what 
extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was damaging?,” “To what extent do you believe 
the manager’s behavior was painful?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior 
was embarrassing?,” and “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was 
humiliating?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). 
Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate perceiving more harm resulting from the 
discriminatory incident (α=.97). 
Perceptions of blame and responsibility.  Participants’ perceptions of blame of the 
manager was measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe the manager is to 
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blame?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager is morally responsible?,” “To what extent 
do you believe the manager should be held accountable?,” and “To what extent do you believe 
the manager deserves blame ?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 
= extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more blame of the 
perpetrator (α=.94). 
Participants’ blame of the victim was measured using a single item: “To what extent do 
you believe Naima is to blame?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 
7 = extremely). 
Support for punishment. Participants indicated their support for punishment of the 
manager and compensation for Naima using six items, “To what extent do you believe the 
manager should be punished?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager should be fired?,” 
“To what extent do you believe the manager should be put on probation?,” “To what extent do 
you believe the manager should apologize to Naima?,” “To what extent do you believe the 
company should promote Naima despite the performance review?” and “Do you believe the 
company should financially compensate Naima?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert 
scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
support for punishment of the manager and compensation for Naima (α=.85). 
Demographics. Participants indicated their gender, race, and age. 
Results  
As in the previous studies, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to 
explore differences between conditions on focal dependent variables. Those analyses were 
followed by planned contrasts comparing the implicit bias framing condition to the control and to 
the explicit bias framing conditions. Participants’ perceived intent, perceived racism, evaluations 
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of the offensiveness of the discrimination, perceived harm, blame for the perpetrator, blame for 
the victim, and support for punishment for the discriminatory incident were examined as a 
function of whether racial bias was defined as implicit, explicit, or was not mentioned, in the 
control condition. Finally, mediation analyses were conducted to test the proposed mechanism, 
perceived intent. Perceived intent was predicted to explain the relationship between the way 
racial bias is framed and responses to discriminatory incidents.  Descriptives and inter-item 
correlations are shown in Table 5.   
Table 5 
Experiment 3 Descriptives and Correlations 
 M SD Perceived Intent 
Perceived 
Racism 
Perceived 
Offensiveness 
Perceived 
Harm 
Perpetrator 
Blame 
Victim 
Blame 
Support for 
Punishment 
Perceived 
Intent 5.04 1.48 -       
Perceived 
Racism 5.78 1.40 .77** -      
Perceived 
Offensiveness 6.07 1.33 .66** .75** -     
Perceived 
Harm 5.89 1.41 .63** .72** .76** -    
Perpetrator 
Blame 5.74 1.40 .69** .79** .78** .71** -   
Victim Blame 2.15 1.55 -.51** -.57** -.62** -.52** -.59** -  
Support for 
Punishment 5.01 1.39 .70** .80** .72** .65** .79** -.56** - 
Note: **p < .01  
Perceptions of intent. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias framing 
on participants’ perceptions of the perpetrator’s intent was significant, F(2, 238) = 4.58, p = 
0.011, hp2 = 0.037 (see Figure 8). 
This analysis was followed by planned contrasts comparing the implicit bias condition to 
the explicit bias condition and to the control condition. Participants in the implicit bias condition 
(M = 4.64, SD = 1.45) perceived less intent than participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 
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5.29, SD = 1.38, t(238) = -2.722, p = 0.007). Similarly, participants in implicit bias condition 
perceived less intent than participants in the control condition (M = 5.20, SD = 1.51), t(238) = 
2.524, p = 0.012.  
 
Figure 8. Whites perceptions of the intent in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 3). 
 
Perceptions of racism. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias 
framing on perceptions of racism was not significant, F(2, 238) = 1.48, p = 0.231, hp2 = 0.012. 
Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. Participants in the 
implicit bias condition (M = 5.56, SD = 1.49) perceived less racism than participants in the 
explicit bias condition (M = 5.94, SD = 1.31), though this difference was only marginally 
statistically significant, t(238) = -1.638, p = 0.103. There was no statistically significant 
difference in perceived racism between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.84, SD = 1.37) 
conditions, although the means were in the predicted direction, t(238) = 1.276, p = 0.203. 
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Offensiveness of the discrimination. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias 
framing did not have a significant effect on offensiveness, F(2, 238) = 1.632, p = 0.198, hp2 = 
0.014. Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. Participants in 
the implicit bias condition (M = 5.96, SD = 1.41) perceived the behavior to be less offensive than 
participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 6.31, SD = 1.03), although this difference was 
only marginally statistically significant, t(238) = -1.599, p = 0.111. There was no difference in 
offensiveness of the behavior between the implicit bias and control (M = 5.98, SD = 1.44), 
conditions, t(238) = 0.086, p = 0.932. 
Perceptions of harm. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not have 
a significant effect on perceptions of harm, F(2, 238) = 1.294, p = 0.276, hp2 = 0.011).  Planned 
contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Planned contrasts did not reveal any 
significant simple effects. Participants in the implicit bias condition (M = 5.69, SD = 1.53) 
perceived the behavior to be less harmful than participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 
6.06, SD = 1.32), although this difference was only marginally statistically significant, t(238) = -
1.559, p = 0.120). There was no difference in perceived harm of the behavior between the 
implicit bias and control (M = 5.94, SD = 1.38, t(238) = 1.132, p = 0.259) conditions, although 
the means were in the predicted direction. 
Perceptions of blame. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on perceptions of perpetrator blame, F(2, 238) = 0.650, p = 0.523, hp2 = 
0.005. Planned contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the implicit 
bias condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.43) blamed the perpetrator less than participants in the explicit 
bias condition (M = 5.89, SD = 1.35), although this difference was not statistically significant, 
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t(238) = -1.063, p = 0.289). There was no difference in perpetrator blame between the implicit 
bias and control (M = 5.69, SD = 1.40) conditions, t(238) = 0.185, p = 0.854. 
In contrast, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing the effect of racial bias 
framing on participants’ blame of the victim revealed that racial bias framing affected victim 
blaming, F(2, 238) = 3.366, p = 0.036, hp2 = 0.028 (see Figure 9). 
Planned contrasts revealed that, consistent with predictions, participants in the implicit 
bias condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.76) blamed the victim more than participants in the explicit 
bias condition (M = 1.86, SD = 1.29), t(238) = 2.538, p = 0.012). Participants in the implicit bias 
condition also blamed the victim more than participants in the control condition (M = 2.09, SD = 
1.51), although the difference was marginally statistically significant, t(238) = -1.752, p = 0.081. 
 
Figure 9. Whites blame of the victim of an incident of discrimination as a function of racial bias 
framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 3). 
 
Support for punishment. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing the effect of 
racial bias framing on participants’ support for punishing the perpetrator revealed that racial bias 
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framing exerted a marginally statistically significant effect on support for punishment, F(2, 238) 
= 2.258,  p = 0.107, hp2 = 0.019 (see Figure 10).  
Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the implicit bias condition (M = 4.75, SD = 
1.33) supported less punishment than participants in the explicit bias condition (M = 5.22, SD = 
1.36, t(238) = -2.047, p = 0.042). Similarly, participants in implicit bias condition supported less 
punishment than participants in the control condition (M = 5.08, SD = 1.44), although this 
difference was only marginally statistically significant, t(238) = 1.529, p = 0.127.  
 
Figure 10. Whites support for punishing the perpetrator of an incident of discrimination as a 
function of racial bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 3). 
 
 Mediation analyses. As in the previous studies, mediation analyses were conducted to 
test whether perceived intent mediated the relationship between racial bias framing and 
evaluations of the discriminatory incident (see Table 6). Given that the predictor (i.e., condition) 
was a categorical variable with three levels, I created two dummy-coded variables to conduct the 
mediation analysis, with the implicit bias framing condition as the reference group. Specifically, 
1
2
3
4
5
6
Control Implicit Bias Explicit Bias
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 P
un
is
hm
en
t
Framing of Racial Bias
  60 
Contrast 1 tested the effect of the implicit bias framing (coded 0) versus the no bias framing 
(coded 1) condition, with the explicit bias framing condition coded 0. Contrast 2 tested for the 
residual difference between the implicit bias framing (coded 0) and the explicit bias framing 
(coded 1) conditions, with the no bias framing condition coded 0. This process was used for each 
outcome measured in the study. The results for Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias 
condition) will be reported first, followed by the results for Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. 
control condition). 
Table 6 
Experiment 3 Indirect Effect of Implicit Bias Framing on Perceived Racism, Offensiveness, 
Harm, Perpetrator Blame, Victim Blame, and Support for Punishment Through Perceived Intent  
Contrast Indirect Effect Bootstrapped Standard Error 
Bias-Corrected 
Lower Limit 
Bias-Corrected 
Upper Limit 
Outcome = Perceived Racism 
Contrast 1 .42 .17 .09 .78 
Contrast 2 .48 .18 .15 .86 
Outcome = Perceived Offensiveness 
Contrast 1 .34 .14 .09 .63 
Contrast 2 .39 .15 .13 .71 
Outcome = Perceived Harm 
Contrast 1 .34 .14 .08 .64 
Contrast 2 .39 .15 .11 .72 
Outcome = Perpetrator Blame 
Contrast 1 .37 .16 .08 .70 
Contrast 2 .43 .17 .14 .78 
Outcome = Victim Blame 
Contrast 1 -.30 .13 -.60 -.07 
Contrast 2 -.34 .14 -.67 -.11 
Outcome = Support for Punishment 
Contrast 1 .37 .15 .09 .68 
Contrast 2 .43 .16 .13 .76 
Note. Contrast 1 = implicit bias condition compared to control condition; Contrast 2 = implicit 
bias condition compared to explicit bias condition. Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Significant indirect effects (p < .05) are highlighted in 
boldface.  
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Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
racism. Consistent with the univariate analyses reported above, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., 
implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p = 
.012. Though not statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to perceived racism, b 
= .273, SE = .214, p = .203. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting perceived racism, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .738, SE = .040, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. control condition) was reduced and the sign changed, b = -.144, SE = .138, p = .298.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect for 
Contrast 1 (.42, SE = .17) was calculated. The null hypothesis of no mediation can be rejected 
when the confidence interval of the indirect effect does not include 0. In the present analyses, the 
confidence interval (with 5,000 resamples) for the estimate of the indirect effect of Contrast 1 
(i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived racism did not include 0, 95% CI [.09, .78] 
supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship between the racial bias 
framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived racism. 
 Similarly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on 
perceived intent was also significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. Though only marginally 
statistically significant, Contrast 2 was positively related to perceived racism, b = .376, SE = 
.230, p = .103. As mentioned above, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously in the model predicting perceived racism, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .738, SE = .040, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived racism was reduced and the sign of the coefficient was 
flipped, b = -.106, SE = .149, p = .475.  
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To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.48, SE = .18) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived racism did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.15, .86], again supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived racism. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
offensiveness of discrimination. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control 
condition) on perceived intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p = .012. Of note, Contrast 1 
was not related to offensiveness of the discrimination, b = .017, SE = .204, p = .931. Moreover, 
when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
acceptance of the discrimination, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .599, SE = 
.044, p < .001. Interestingly, the effect of Contrast 1 on perceived offensiveness became 
statistically significant, b = -.322, SE = .155, p = .040. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.34, SE = .14) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on offensiveness of the 
discrimination did not include 0, 95% CI [.09, .63], supporting my prediction that perceived 
intent mediates the relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to 
control condition) and offensiveness of the discrimination.  
The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. While only marginally statistically significant, 
Contrast 2 was positively related to offensiveness of the discrimination, b = .349, SE = .219, p = 
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.111. As mentioned above, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered 
simultaneously into the model predicting offensiveness, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = .599, SE = .044, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias 
vs. explicit bias condition) was eliminated, b = -.042, SE = .167, p = .798.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.39, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on offensiveness of the 
discrimination did not include 0, 95% CI [.13, .71], supporting my prediction that perceived 
intent mediates the relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to 
explicit bias condition) and offensiveness of the discrimination.  
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perceived 
harm. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 on perceived intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p 
= .012. Though not statistically significant, Contrast 1 was positively related to perceived harm, 
b = .246, SE = .217, p = .259. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were 
entered simultaneously in the model predicting perceived harm, the effect of perceived intent 
was significant, b = .608, SE = .049, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit 
bias vs. control condition) was eliminated, b = -.098, SE = .171, p = .567. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.34, SE = .14) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived harm did not include 0, 
95% CI [.08, .64], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perceived 
harm. 
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The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was statistically significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. Though not statistically significant, 
Contrast 2 was positively related to perceived harm, b = .363, SE = .233, p = .120. As mentioned 
above, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model 
predicting perceived harm, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .608, SE = .049, p < 
.001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was 
eliminated, b = -.035, SE = .14, p = .849.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.39, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived harm did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.11, .72], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to explicit bias condition) 
and perceived harm. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and perpetrator 
blame. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 on perceived intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p 
= .012. Unexpectedly, Contrast 1 was not related to perpetrator blame, b = .040, SE = .215, p = 
.854. When perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model 
predicting perpetrator blame, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .662, SE = .045, p 
< .001. Of note, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perpetrator 
blame became statistically significant, b = -.335, SE = .158, p = .035. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.37, SE = .16) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perpetrator blame did not include 
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0, 95% CI [.08, .70], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and perpetrator 
blame. 
 The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. Although not statistically significant, Contrast 2 
was positively related to perpetrator blame, b = .245, SE = .230, p = .289. Moreover, when 
perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
perpetrator blame, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .662, SE = .045, p < .001. Of 
note, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) remained 
nonsignificant, although the sign on the coefficient flipped, b = -.189, SE = .170, p = .268.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.43, SE = .17) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perpetrator blame did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.14, .78], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing and perpetrator blame. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and victim 
blame. Again, the effect of Contrast 1 on perceived intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p 
= .012. Contrast 1 was negatively related to victim blame, although the effect was marginally 
statistically significant, b = -.414, SE = .236, p = .081. When perceived intent and the two 
contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting victim blame, the effect of 
perceived intent was significant, b = -.522, SE = .060, p < .001. Importantly, the effect of 
Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on victim blame was reduced, b = -.119, SE = 
.208, p = .569. 
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To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (-.30, SE = .13) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on victim blame did not include 0, 
95% CI [-.60, -.07], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the racial bias framing (implicit bias compared to control condition) and victim blame. 
 The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. Contrast 2 was positively related to victim blame, 
b = -.643, SE = .253, p = .012. Moreover, when perceived intent and the two contrasts were 
entered simultaneously in the model predicting victim blame, the effect of perceived intent was 
significant, b = -.522, SE = .060, p < .001. Of note, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. 
explicit bias condition) was reduced, b = -.302, SE = .224, p = .179.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (-.34, SE = .14) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on victim blame did not include 
0, 95% CI [-.67, .-11], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the relationship 
between the racial bias framing and victim blame. 
Intent as a mediator of the relationship between implicit bias framing and support for 
punishment. Again, the effect of Contrast 1(i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on perceived 
intent was significant, b = .566, SE = .224, p = .012. Though not statistically significant, Contrast 
1 was positively related to support for punishment, b = .325, SE = .213, p = .128. Moreover, 
when perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
support for punishment, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .660, SE = .044, p < 
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.001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) was 
eliminated, b = -.048, SE = .155, p = .756. 
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 1 (.37, SE = .15) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 1 (i.e., implicit bias vs. control condition) on support for punishment did not 
include 0, 95% CI [.09, .68], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing and support for punishment. 
 The effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on perceived intent 
was significant, b = .654, SE = .240, p = .007. Contrast 2 was positively and statistically 
significantly related to support for punishment, b = .467, SE = .228, p = .042. Moreover, when 
perceived intent and the two contrasts were entered simultaneously in the model predicting 
support for punishment, the effect of perceived intent was significant, b = .660, SE = .044, p < 
.001. Importantly, the effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) was 
eliminated, b = .035, SE = .167, p = .835.  
To test for mediation, a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
Contrast 2 (.43, SE = .16) was calculated. The confidence interval for the estimate of the indirect 
effect of Contrast 2 (i.e., implicit bias vs. explicit bias condition) on support for punishment did 
not include 0, 95% CI [.13, .76], supporting my prediction that perceived intent mediates the 
relationship between the racial bias framing and support for punishment. 
Discussion 
The present data suggest that, in line with the previous Experiments, framing racial bias 
in terms of implicit bias can reduce Whites’ perceptions of the intent exhibited by perpetrators 
who discriminate. Perceived intent again mediated the relationship between the way racial bias is 
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framed and the outcome variables—perceived racism, offensiveness of the discrimination, harm, 
perpetrator blame, victim blame, and support for punishment. A specific contribution of this 
Experiment is the finding that racial bias framing had a stronger effect on blame of the victim 
than blame of the perpetrator. In addition, it is notable that even when the perpetrator of 
discrimination explictly stated a biased belief about African-American employees, framing racial 
bias in terms of implicit bias undermined the intent observers perceived in his treatment of his 
Black employee. 
Taken together, Experiments 1-3 provide support for the proposition that framing racial 
bias in terms of implicit bias can reduce the intent perceived in incidents of discrimination. These 
studies also provide evidence that perceived intent is a mechanism through which implicit bias 
framing can affect other evaluations of discriminatory incidents, like how harmful or worthy of 
punishment they are.  
I have argued thus far that framing racial bias as implicit causes Whites to perceive 
discrimination in general as less intentional, which in turn has been shown to reduce the racism, 
offensiveness, harm, and blame that Whites perceive in incidents of discrimination, and the 
support for punishment that Whites exhibit in response to discrimination. So far, however, I have 
demonstrated this statistically, but there are limits to the claims one can make about causality 
from statistical tests of mediation (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005; Bullock, Green, & Ha, 
2010). To address this, in Experiment 4, the proposed mediator—perceived intent—is directly 
manipulated rather than measured.  
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CHAPTER 5: Experiment 4 
Experiments 1-3 provide evidence that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias can 
undermine perceptions of the severity of incidents of discrimination through reducing perceived 
intent. The discrimination reported in Experiment 3 was committed by a perpetrator who 
explicitly espoused negative beliefs about African Americans to an African American employee. 
Still, framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias reduced perceived intent and in turn, 
perceptions of the severity of incidents of discrimination. In addition, Experiment 3 found that 
framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias increased victim blaming. Although these findings 
are consistent with my hypotheses regarding the central role of intent, the mediator of perceived 
intent has not yet been experimentally manipulated. Thus, the aim of Experiment 4 was to 
directly test intent as the mechanism driving the effect of framing racial bias in terms of implicit 
bias on perceptions of the severity of discriminatory incidents.  
Consistent with Experiments 1-3 I anticipated that framing racial bias as unintentional 
would affect the perceived intent of perpetrators of discrimination. In addition, when racial bias 
is framed as unintentional, I predict that participants will perceive less racism, offensiveness, 
harm, blame the perpetrator less, blame the victim more, and support less punishment than when 
racial bias is framed as intentional, or when no information is provided. In addition, replicating 
the earlier studies, I predicted that perceived intent of the perpetrator will mediate the 
relationship between the way racial bias is framed and the outcomes measured in this study.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid 
$0.40 for their participation. Three hundred and six White adults (122 men, 181 women, 3 
unidentified; Mage = 37, SD =12.15) completed the study.  
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Design and procedure. This study had a 3 cell (Racial Bias Framing: Control, 
Unintentional, Intentional) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition.  
As in Experiment 3, first, participants were told that they would be asked to read a report 
about workplace discrimination. Participants in the experimental conditions were then given a 
definition to help them with their evaluation. Participants in the control condition did not receive 
any definition and skipped directly to reading the report of discrimination. As in Experiments 1 
and 3, “racial bias” was defined for participants and the definition was the focal experimental 
manipulation of racial bias framing. Here, instead of referring to explicit or implicit bias and 
conscious or unconscious negative stereotypes, the definition referred to racial bias as intentional 
or unintentional. Participants in the unintentional condition read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be unintentional, meaning people’s attitudes 
and beliefs about different groups unintentionally affect their 
thoughts, feelings, and actions toward individual members of those 
groups.  
 
Participants in the intentional condition read the following definition: 
Racial bias occurs when people are treated differently based on 
race. Racial bias can be intentional, meaning people’s attitudes and 
beliefs about different groups intentionally affect their thoughts, 
feelings, and actions toward individual members of those groups.  
 
After reading the definition, participants were asked to re-type the definition, to ensure 
that they read it. Then, all participants read the report about the instance of workplace 
discrimination from Experiment 3. 
After receiving a business degree, Naima, a 32-year-old African 
American woman, was hired as an entry-level associate in a cohort 
of several new hires. Initially, like other new associates, Naima 
received routine assignments. In addition, her performance 
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evaluations from her assigning manager were similar to those 
given to other members of her cohort. 
  
But, as other associates became increasingly busy with complex, 
long-term projects, Naima noticed that she continued to receive 
projects that were short-term and routine. At her most recent 
performance review, her manager told Naima that, unlike the other 
members of her cohort, her performance did not meet the 
company’s high standards for number of billable hours and the 
revenue being brought in. As a result, she was in danger of being 
put on probation, which could lead to termination. The manager 
also mentioned that African American hires like Naima typically 
do not do well in the company. 
  
Naima feels that the disparity between how she and her co-workers 
are allocated demanding work is, in part, because she is African 
American. Naima filed a racial discrimination claim for inequitable 
allocation of employment and advancement opportunities.   
 
After reading the report, participants answered the focal dependent variables. The order 
reported below is the order the measures were displayed to participants. Intent was moved to the 
end of the experiment so that it could serve primarily as a manipulation check. 
Perceptions of harm. Participants’ perceptions of the harm done to the Black employee 
were measured using six items: “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was 
harmful?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was hurtful?,” “To what 
extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was damaging?,” “To what extent do you believe 
the manager’s behavior was painful?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior 
was embarrassing?,” and “To what extent do you believe the manager’s behavior was 
humiliating?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). 
Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate perceiving more harm resulting from the 
discriminatory incident (α=.95). 
Perceptions of blame and responsibility.  Participants’ blame of the manager was 
measured using four items: “To what extent do you believe the manager is to blame?,” “To what 
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extent do you believe the manager is morally responsible?,” “To what extent do you believe the 
manager should be held accountable?,”  “To what extent do you believe the manager deserves 
blame ?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  Items 
were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more blame of the perpetrator (α=.96). 
Participants’ blame of the victim was measured using a single item: “To what extent do 
you believe Naima is to blame?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 
7 = extremely). 
Support for punishment. Participants indicated their support for punishment of the 
manager and compensation for Naima using six items: “To what extent do you believe the 
manager should be punished?,” “To what extent do you believe the manager should be fired?,” 
“To what extent do you believe the manager should be put on probation?,” “To what extent do 
you believe the manager should apologize to Naima?,” “To what extent do you believe the 
company should promote Naima despite the performance review?,” and “Do you believe the 
company should financially compensate Naima?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert 
scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
support for punishment of the manager and compensation for Naima (α=.84). 
Offensiveness of the manager’s behavior. Participants’ perceptions of the manager’s 
behavior as offensive were measured using seven items: “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was offensive?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was a problem?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was acceptable?” (R), “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was disrespectful?,” “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was right?” (R), “To what extent do you believe that the 
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manager’s treatment of Naima was wrong?,” and  “To what extent do you believe that the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was appropriate? (R). Responses were made using 7-point Likert 
scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more 
offensiveness of the discriminatory behavior (α=.93). 
Perceptions of racism. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s racism were measured 
using two items: “To what extent do you believe the manager’s treatment of Naima was racist?” 
and “To what extent do you believe the employee holds negative attitudes toward African-
Americans?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at all, 7 = extremely).  
Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate perceiving more racism on the part of the 
perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.90). 
Perceptions of intent. Participants’ perceptions of the employee’s intent to discriminate 
against the Black patron were measured using six items: “To what extent do you believe the 
manager’s treatment of Naima was intentionally discriminatory?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee meant to treat Naima poorly because of her race?,” “To what extent do you 
believe the employee tries to treat all employees fairly regardless of race?” (R), “To what extent 
do you believe the employee’s treatment of Naima was intentionally harmful?,” “To what extent 
do you believe the employee wanted to harm Jamal?,” and “To what extent do you believe the 
manager wanted to offend Naima?” Responses were made using 7-point Likert scales (1= not at 
all, 7 = extremely).  Items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more perceiving more 
intent on the part of the perpetrator of the discriminatory incident (α=.94).  
Demographics. Participants indicated their gender, race, and age. 
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Results  
As in the previous studies, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to 
explore differences between conditions on focal dependent variables. Those analyses were 
followed by planned contrasts comparing the unintentional framing condition to the control and 
to the intentional framing conditions. Participants’ perceived intent, perceived racism, 
evaluations of the offensiveness of the discrimination, perceived harm, blame for the perpetrator, 
blame for the victim, and support for punishment for the discriminatory incident were examined 
as a function of whether racial bias was defined as unintentional, intentional, or was undefined in 
the control condition. Finally, mediation analyses were planned to test the proposed mechanism, 
perceived intent. Perceived intent was predicted to explain the relationship between the way 
racial bias is framed and responses to discriminatory incidents.  Descriptives and inter-item 
correlations are shown in Table 7.   
Table 7 
Experiment 4 Descriptives and Correlations 
 M SD Perceived Intent 
Perceived 
Racism 
Perceived 
Offensiveness 
Perceived 
Harm 
Perpetrator 
Blame 
Victim 
Blame 
Support for 
Punishment 
Perceived 
Intent 4.95 1.50 -       
Perceived 
Racism 5.87 1.26 .71** -      
Perceived 
Offensiveness 6.21 1.08 .60** .78** -     
Perceived 
Harm 5.88 1.25 .51** .64** .68** -    
Perpetrator 
Blame 5.86 1.33 .61** .74** .77** .66** -   
Victim Blame 2.14 1.39 -.47** -.55** -.65** -.46** -.49** -  
Support for 
Punishment 5.01 1.32 .65** .70** .72** .55** .73** -.52** - 
Note: **p < .01. For ease of comparison across the studies, the order of variables is the same as 
the previous studies but do not follow the order in this section.  
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Perceptions of harm. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not have 
a significant effect on perceptions of harm, F(2, 303) = 0.085, p = 0.918, hp2 = 0.001. Planned 
contrasts did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the unintentional condition 
(M = 5.87, SD = 1.30) perceived the behavior to be as harmful as participants in the intentional 
condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.37) t(303) = 0.057, p = 0.955). There was also no difference in 
perceived harm of the behavior between the unintentional and control (M = 5.92, SD = 1.10) 
conditions, t(303) = 0.318, p = 0.751). 
Perceptions of blame. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did not 
have a significant effect on blame, F(2, 303) = 0.523, p = 0.593, hp2 = 0.003. Planned contrasts 
did not reveal any significant simple effects. Participants in the unintentional condition (M = 
5.78, SD = 1.43) blamed the perpetrator as much as participants in the intentional condition (M = 
5.83, SD = 1.35), t(303) = -.302, p = 0.763). There was no difference in perpetrator blame 
between the unintentional and control (M = 5.96, SD = 1.25) conditions, t(303) = 0.990, p = 
0.323. 
However, a one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing did have a marginally 
statistically significant effect on victim blaming, F(2, 301) = 3.009, p = 0.051, hp2 = 0.020 (see 
Figure 11). Planned contrasts revealed that, consistent with predictions, participants in the 
unintentional condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.69) blamed the victim more than participants in the 
intentional condition (M = 1.90, SD = 1.13), t(301) = 2.452, p = 0.015). There was no difference 
in victim blame between the unintentional and control (M = 2.15, SD = 1.29) conditions, 
although the means were in the predicted direction, t(301) = -1.244, p = 0.215. 
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Figure 11. Whites blame of the victim of an incident of discrimination as a function of racial bias 
framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 4). 
 
Support for punishment. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias framing had a 
statistically significant effect on support for punishment, F(2, 303) = 3.813,  p = 0.023, hp2 = 
0.025 (see Figure 12). Planned contrasts revealed that, consistent with predictions, participants in 
the unintentional condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.43) supported less punishment than participants in 
the intentional condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.29, t(303) = -2.154, p = 0.032). Similarly, 
participants in unintentional condition supported less punishment than participants in the control 
condition (M = 5.18, SD = 1.21), t(303) = 2.602, p = 0.010.  
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Figure 12. Whites support for punishing the perpetrator of an incident of discrimination as a 
function of racial bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 4). 
 
Offensiveness of the discrimination. A one-way ANOVA revealed that racial bias 
framing did not have a significant effect on offensiveness, F(2, 303) = 1.483, p = 0.229, hp2 = 
0.10. Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. Participants in 
the unintentional condition (M = 6.06, SD = 1.20) perceived the behavior to be less offensive 
than participants in the intentional condition (M = 6.31, SD = 0.97), although this difference was 
only marginally statistically significant, t(303) = -1.636, p = 0.103. Participants in the 
unintentional condition also perceived less offensiveness than participants in the control (M = 
6.26, SD = 1.07) condition, though this difference was not statistically significant, t(303) = 
1.319, p = 0.188. 
Perceptions of racism. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of racial bias 
framing on perceptions of racism was not significant, F(2, 303) = 1.53, p = 0.218, hp2 = 0.10.  
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Planned contrasts did not reveal any statistically significant simple effects. Participants in 
the unintentional condition (M = 5.70, SD = 1.36) perceived less racism than participants in the 
intentional condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.26), though this difference was only marginally 
statistically significant, t(303) = -1.614, p = 0.108. There was no significant difference in 
perceived racism between the unintentional and control (M = 5.96, SD = 1.29) conditions, 
although the means were in the predicted direction, t(303) = 1.422, p = 0.156. 
Perceptions of intent. To examine the effect of framing racial bias as unintentional, 
intentional, or providing no information about racial bias on perceptions of the perpetrator’s 
intent to discriminate against the victim. The effect of racial bias framing on perceptions of intent 
was not statistically significant, F(2, 305) = 1.84, p = 0.161, hp2 = 0.012 (see Figure 13). 
This analysis was followed by planned contrasts comparing the unintentional condition to 
the intentional condition and to the control condition. Participants in the unintentional condition 
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.62) perceived less intent than participants in the intentional condition (M = 
5.02, SD = 1.38), though this different was not statistically significant, t(303) = -1.460, p = 
0.145. Participants in unintentional condition perceived less intent than participants in the control 
condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.49), though this difference was marginally statistically significant, 
t(303) = 1.826, p = 0.069.  
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Figure 13. Whites perceptions of the intent in an incident of discrimination as a function of racial 
bias framing. Error bars indicate standard errors. (Experiment 4). 
 
Mediation analyses. As in the previous studies, mediation analyses were considered, to 
test whether perceived intent of the perpetrator mediated the relationship between racial bias 
framing and evaluations of the discriminatory incident. However, because the manipulation of 
the intentionality of racial bias did not exert a significant effect on perceived intent, the 
mediation analyses were not conducted.  
Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to test intent as a mechanism for why implicit bias 
framing reduces perceptions of the severity of incidents of discrimination. On one hand, framing 
racial bias as unintentional or intentional did not exert a statistically significant effect on our 
measure of intent, potentially suggesting that the manipulation was not strong enough. This 
measure came at the end of a number of items and the effect of the manipulation might have 
become weaker by then. On the other hand, consistent with Experiment 3, our manipulation of 
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racial bias framing did directly affect support for punishment and blame of the victim, which 
came earlier in the experiment. Because the manipulation did not exert an effect on perceived 
intent, tests of mediation were not conducted. These mixed results suggest that a different 
manipulation of intent might yield more promising results.  
Experiment 4 could have followed a traditional 2 (Type of Bias: Implicit, Explicit) x 2 
(Intent: Unintentional, Intentional) between-subjects design. This design would have yielded 4 
conditions: Implicit Bias/Unintentional, Implicit Bias/Intentional, Explicit Bias/Unintentional, 
and Explicit Bias/Intentional. However, there is some difficulty with creating a definition for the 
Implicit Bias/Intentional condition. It is difficult to imagine a definition of racial bias that 
attributes racial bias to unconscious stereotypes which are also intentionally applied. Instead, I 
chose to only manipulate intent but may have ended up with explicit bias/unintentional and 
explicit bias/intentional conditions, rather than something more like implicit bias/unintentional 
and explicit bias/intentional conditions. One way to address this limitation would be to create a 
manipulation with three conditions that correspond to Implicit Bias/Unintentional, Explicit 
Bias/Unintentional, and Explicit Bias/Intentional. A second way to address this limitation would 
be to manipulate implicit bias framing and intent separately. The former could be manipulated 
using the definitions from Experiments 1 and 3 and the latter using a free will manipulation (e.g., 
Shariff et al., 2014) or an intent manipulation (e.g., Cooley et al., 2014).  
 
CHAPTER 6: General Discussion 
 Four experiments tested whether framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias can 
undermine White observers’ evaluations of the severity of racial discrimination by reducing the 
perceived intentionality of perpetrators of discrimination. My results provide support for this 
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assertion. The findings of the present research emerged over multiple experimental 
manipulations. Racial bias was framed as implicit or explicit via the definitions that participants 
read before learning about an incident of discrimination (Experiment 1 and 3) and in a mock 
newspaper article about an incident of discrimination (Experiment 2). To directly test the 
proposed mechanism, racial bias was framed as unintentional or intentional via the definitions 
that participants read before learning about an incident of discrimination (Experiment 4). I 
observed these effects on several evaluations of the incident, including perceived racism, 
offensiveness, harm, perpetrator blame, and support for punishment (Experiments 1-3). In 
addition, the effect of racial bias framing was found to be particularly strong for victim blame 
and support for punishment (Experiments 3 and 4).  I examined these effects in multiple contexts 
where racial discrimination is common: customer service (Experiment 1), contact with law 
enforcement (Experiment 2), and in the workplace (Experiments 3 and 4). The effect of the 
implicit bias vs. explicit bias framing contrast on perceived intent was more reliable 
(Experiments 1-3) in terms of statistical significance than the control vs. implicit bias framing 
contrast (Experiment 3). Taken together, the present experiments reveal that framing racial bias 
as implicit, particularly when compared to the alternative option of framing racial bias as 
explicit, reduces the intent perceived of perpetrators of incidents of discrimination, which 
mediates the relationship between implicit bias framing and negative evaluations of the incident. 
The attempt in Study 4 to manipulate intent did not directly affect perceived racism, harm, 
perpetrator blame, or intent, but it did directly affect victim blame and support for punishment.  
Theoretical Implications  
The findings reported in the present research are particularly compelling in light of 
previous research that has found that awareness of one’s own racial bias can subsequently reduce 
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it (e.g., Pope et al., 2014; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002) and make observers more likely to 
regard subtle instances of discrimination as racism (Perry et al., 2015). In contrast, by focusing 
on the effect of exposure to the general concept of implicit bias, the current research identified 
that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias can undermine perceptions of the intent in 
incidents of discrimination and as such, can have downstream consequences for how racist, 
offensive, harmful, blameworthy, and worthy of punishment the incident of discrimination is 
perceived to be. Although Whites differ in the extent to which they consider subtle and biased 
behaviors to be racist (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears & Henry, 2005; Sommers & Norton, 
2006), in this study, implicit bias framing, especially relative to explicit bias framing, exerted a 
similar effect on the perceived intent of both subtle and more blatant racist behaviors, and thus, a 
similar effect on evaluations of the incident.  
These findings contribute to the growing literature on unexpected negative consequences 
of the way intergroup phenomena are framed. In one set of findings, information about an 
organization’s diversity policies has been found to reduce willingness to respond to 
discrimination claims (e.g., Kaiser, Major, Jurcevic, Dover, Brady, & Shapiro, 2013). In 
addition, framing automatic stereotyping as highly prevalent creates a descriptive norm about 
stereotypes that ultimately yields more stereotyping compared to framing automatic stereotyping 
as less prevalent or focusing messages on the high prevalence of efforts to fight stereotyping 
(Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015). As a third example, framing interventions to complex social 
problems as simple and easy, rather than as more intensive and involved, increased blame and 
reduced empathy for the targets of those interventions (Ikizer & Blanton, 2016). The present 
findings show that implicit bias framing can also affect how individuals respond to specific 
incidents of discrimination.   
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Practical Implications 
This research has great practical importance given the frequency with which racial bias is 
framed as implicit. One example served as inspiration for the materials in Experiment 1. Kamau 
Bell, a Black comedian based in the Bay Area, was meeting his wife and her friends, all of whom 
were White, at a local café in January of 2015. An employee of the café mistook him for a 
panhandler and, from inside the restaurant, rudely gestured to him to leave the women alone. 
Bell was very upset by this incident and posted it on his website, garnering negative publicity for 
the restaurant. A couple of months later, he, his wife, and the restaurant owner participated in a 
community panel about “implicit bias and microaggression experiences in the East Bay.” A 
second example served as inspiration for the materials in Experiment 2. In August of 2014, 
Darren Wilson, a White police officer in Ferguson, MI, fatally shot Michael Brown, an 18-year-
old Black boy. In his testimony recounting the incident, Wilson described Brown as “a demon, 
that’s how angry he looked” and that “…when [Brown] grabbed him, the only way [Wilson 
could] describe it is that [Wilson] felt like a five-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan.” Many 
writers explained Wilson’s characterization of Brown and decision to shoot as due to implicit 
bias (e.g., Letzer, 2014). In a report investigating the Ferguson Police Department, the 
Department of Justice found a clear pattern of racial discrimination against African Americans. 
In describing the report, then Attorney General Eric Holder referred to Ferguson as: “A 
community where this harm [to African American residents] frequently appears to stem, at least 
in part, from racial bias – both implicit and explicit.” 
These two examples demonstrate the spread of implicit bias as an attribution for 
contemporary discrimination. It happens to be the case that in both of these incidents the 
perpetrators were not punished. We cannot be sure that this is due to these incidents’ association 
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with implicit bias. However, in response to these incidents, the restaurant held a community 
discussion about implicit bias and the Ferguson police department instituted diversity training for 
police and African American hires (Cloherty & Levine, 2015). Indeed, in response to the 
growing discussion of biased policing, many police departments around the country are 
instituting unconscious bias trainings (e.g., Wallace, Johnson, Eberhardt, & Johnson, n.d.). The 
data presented in this investigation suggest that to the extent that these responses focus on 
implicit bias, they might actually undermine the intent perceived in future incidents of 
discrimination and thus undermine perceptions of the severity of the discrimination. These real-
world examples give the manipulations and vignettes used in this investigation high external 
validity.  
 Separately, one issue that the current research has to contend with concerns the definition 
of implicit bias. Although research has examined this phenomenon for decades, the use of the 
concept has become quite diffuse. Sometimes instances of explicit racial or sexual discrimination 
are also framed as due to implicit bias. For instance, in some of the media reports covering Ellen 
Pao’s lawsuit against her former employer, Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers, many of the 
incidents cited were actually blatant incidents of sexual harassment, like being propositioned by 
a superior. Journalists, however, still invoked implicit bias as an explanation for the behavior 
(e.g., Ruiz, 2015). The results of Experiment 3, in which the perpetrator expressed biased beliefs 
about African American employees, suggest that framing even relatively more blatant 
discriminatory incidents in terms of implicit bias can still reduce perceived intent. The findings 
of Experiment 3, in particular, suggest that caution should be exercised with describing instances 
of discrimination in terms of implicit bias. 
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Caution is particularly warranted given the major methodological critiques that have been 
leveled at the concept and measurement of implicit bias. The critiques have primarily centered 
on the most popular measure of implicit bias, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), but by 
extension, have called into question IAT proponents’ claims that implicit bias is widespread 
(Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006, 2008; Blanton, Jaccard, Klick, Mellers, & 
Mitchell, 2009; Blanton, Jaccard, Strauts, Mitchell, and Tetlock, 2015), unknown to individuals 
(e.g., Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair 2014; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001), or more 
stable and sensitive to early experiences and therefore more useful for predicting behavior in the 
long term  (Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017). This work reported here underscores 
the need for precision when discussing implicit bias and implicit attitudes.  
However, these methodological concerns do not present a limitation of the current 
investigation because the focus is on the effect of exposing White Americans to information 
about the concept of implicit bias.  The actual existence of implicit bias and the predictive ability 
of the IAT are not relevant to the processes reported here, in which information about implicit 
bias calls into question the intentionality of group-based discrimination and reduces negative 
evaluations of that discrimination. However, if implicit bias does not exist, or does not directly 
predict discrimination, the implications of the findings described in this work are all the more 
alarming. The increasing popularity of the concept of implicit bias may negatively affect 
perceptions of discrimination, rendering majority group members less concerned about them. As 
a result, discrimination and racial disparities might persist un- or under-addressed because the 
frame used to describe contemporary racial bias, implicit bias, actually relieves discriminators 
from culpability. To the extent that current efforts to address racial discrimination focus on 
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implicit bias without discussing explicit bias, they run the risk of reducing perceptions that 
discrimination, including more overt forms of bias, is intentional. 
Limitations 
 One limitation of the present research is that in all the studies the framing of racial bias 
was manipulated by linking racial bias with implicit or explicit bias (or unintentional or 
intentional bias) in a mutually exclusive manner. This choice was made to cleanly test the 
predictions. However, implicit bias and explicit bias are not mutually exclusive and are not 
always presented separately from one another. Adding a condition that frames racial bias in 
terms of both implicit and explicit bias would address this limitation and serve as a potential 
strategy for ameliorating the effect explored here. 
 A second limitation of this investigation is that all the studies were vignette studies and 
the outcomes were evaluations of discriminatory incidents detailed in the vignettes. While this 
choice provided experimental control, it limits the external validity of the research. Designing 
lab studies that feature live interactions and assess behavioral outcomes would address this 
limitation and bolster the generalizability of the research. 
A third limitation of these students concerns the small effect sizes on some of the 
outcomes. This might be due to the choice to manipulate implicit bias by framing racial bias in 
general in terms of implicit bias or explicit bias. A stronger manipulation might be to directly 
attribute the discriminatory behavior of the perpetrator to implicit or explicit bias.   
Future Directions 
The reported findings contribute to a growing literature about the ways intergroup 
phenomena can be framed in ways that undermine efforts to reduce inequality and highlight the 
need for nuance when discussing implicit bias. As such, the findings raise several questions that 
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would benefit from additional investigation and which have implications for organizational 
diversity trainings in particular. 
When does learning about bias reduce discrimination? The first question that these 
findings raise is whether there exists a moderator that might predict when awareness about 
different diversity concepts will help reduce discrimination as opposed to perpetuating it. The 
results of the present work suggest that awareness about the concept of implicit bias reduced 
perceived intent in discrimination committed by others. This is line with research finding that 
exposure to information about the high prevalence of automatic stereotyping increases 
stereotyping (Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015). However, it is in contrast to work finding that 
awareness of one’s own bias reduces subsequent discrimination (e.g., Pope et al., 2014, Son 
Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002) and increases sensitivity to subtle forms of discrimination (e.g., 
Perry et al., 2015). The distinction between these findings seems to be that learning about a 
discrimination related concept, in general, ironically perpetuates discrimination, whereas 
learning about discrimination as it applies to oneself reduces one’s willingness to contribute to 
discrimination. This might be the case because learning about one’s own bias is distressing, 
particularly for Whites who are concerned about appearing prejudiced (Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003). In general, Whites expect their implicit bias to be less than it is, are threatened by 
feedback about implicit bias, and avoid information about implicit bias if they believe it will be 
unfavorable (Howell, Collison, Crysel, Garrido, Newell, Cottrell, Smith, & Shepperd, 2013). 
When Whites are actually confronted with information about their bias, however, they might be 
motivated to address it to reinstate their perception of themselves as egalitarian. A fruitful 
avenue for future research would explicitly test this potential moderator, self-relevance of 
implicit bias.  
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 Is there a missing suppressor variable? A second question has to do with the 
inconsistent main effect of racial bias framing on the measured outcomes. Although a total effect 
of the predictor on the outcome variables is not required for exploring mediation (Rucker et al., 
2011), one reason why main effects might not be detected is that there might be an additional 
unmeasured mediator that exerts an indirect effect of the opposite sign, a suppressor variable. 
One potential suppressor variable is bias awareness, which is Whites’ awareness of and concern 
about subtle forms of discrimination (Perry et al., 2015). Specifically, framing racial bias as 
implicit might both reduce perceived intent and increase bias awareness of subtle forms of 
discrimination. Reducing perceived intent results in reduced perceptions of the severity of 
discrimination, as identified in this investigation. It is not clear what the relationship is between 
bias awareness and perceptions of the severity of discrimination. In one investigation, Whites 
who had high bias awareness were more likely to identify subtle incidents of discrimination as 
racist compared to Whites who had low bias awareness (Perry et al., 2015). This suggests that 
Whites who were high in bias awareness might also be more likely to evaluate incidents of 
discrimination as harmful, blameworthy, and worthy of punishment.  
However, it might also be the case that although these Whites are more aware of bias, and 
better able to identify subtle discrimination as racist, this awareness does not extend to 
perceptions of the harm that arises from an incident or support for blaming or punishing the 
perpetrator. In fact, Whites high in bias awareness might be particularly defensive and resist 
labeling subtle discrimination as harmful or worthy of blame and punishment because they are 
aware that they also commit these instances of bias, and this awareness implicates them as racist. 
Additional research could resolve these competing predictions by measuring bias awareness and 
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examining the relationships between bias awareness and the dependent variables examined in 
this work.  
What are the lay beliefs about implicit bias? The third question concerns how 
laypeople think about implicit bias and how this compares to what we know about how 
laypeople think about “racism” (e.g., Sommers & Norton, 2006). For this investigation, it would 
be particularly important to recruit a community sample, perhaps in a mall or grocery store, as 
college students and even workers on Mechanical Turk are likely to have been exposed to the 
concept, either through studies or greater access to internet and media. An investigation of this 
issue might first assess how laypeople define implicit and explicit bias and how well these 
definitions comport with the definitions in the research literature. This investigation could also 
assess to what extent people think discrimination in general is due to implicit or explicit bias. For 
example, do people think most discrimination today is due to implicit bias, explicit bias, some 
other form of bias like structural bias, or neither? A third topic to examine is whether the context 
in which discrimination occurs, like contact with the police compared to a meeting with a 
manager in the workplace, affects people’s attributions of discrimination to implicit or explicit 
bias. For example, perhaps because of the high-stakes, split-second decision making involved in 
policing, observers might be more likely to attribute discrimination that occurs in that context to 
implicit bias, whereas in a more measured, structured interaction like between a manager and an 
employee, any discrimination that occurs might be more likely to be attributed to explicit bias. 
Finally, it might be enlightening to use Lexus Nexus to analyze the frequency of mentions of 
implicit bias in news articles and how that relates to mentions of individual punishment or 
support for policy changes to address discrimination.  
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How does implicit bias framing affect perceptions of structural discrimination? A 
fourth question concerns whether implicit bias framing of structural discrimination might have 
different, more promising outcomes than implicit bias framing of individual discrimination. Take 
the context of a police shooting of an unarmed Black person. While the results reported here 
suggest that implicit bias framing undermines responses to that incident and individual 
perpetrator, perhaps implicit bias framing would increase support for policies, like body cameras, 
that address structural issues, relative to explicit bias framing. Explicit bias framing might 
increase support for punishing an individual police officer, but result in leaving structural issues 
unaddressed since the individual was sanctioned. Thus, implicit bias framing might reduce 
support for punishing an individual police officer since perceptions of his intent are reduced, but 
increase support for addressing structural issues to still ultimately address the discriminatory 
outcome. This is an important future direction because leaders who are deciding how to discuss 
discrimination need to consider the tradeoffs of the two approaches. 
How can implicit bias be discussed to increase perceptions of the severity of 
discrimination? A fifth question raised by these results is whether it is possible to discuss 
implicit bias in ways that do induce sympathetic responses. Not focusing on intent is commonly 
believed to improve Whites’ receptivity to information about persisting racial disparities and 
makes Whites more comfortable with discussions about racial bias (e.g., Sen, 2012). There have 
been consistent and dramatic reductions in professed, explicit racial antipathy by White 
Americans (Schuman, et al., 1997), so focusing on intentional racial antipathy can seem 
anachronous and can result in defensiveness from White Americans in particular. While focusing 
on intent may in fact yield defensiveness from Whites, the present results suggest an unexpected 
cost of this approach to combating defensiveness: reducing White observers’ perceptions of the 
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culpability and support for consequences for those who commit acts of bias. What would help 
those who seek to share about implicit bias reduce or avoid this cost? I would like to discuss 
three potential ways to reduce this cost.  
Making implicit bias self-relevant. As mentioned earlier, perhaps framing the 
information about implicit bias as self-relevant will help. Many training programs currently do 
this by having participants complete the IAT and notice their difficulty completing the task when 
the Black exemplars are paired with “good” words and the White exemplars are paired with 
“bad” words as opposed to vice versa. Perhaps this is a useful tool to pair with information about 
implicit bias. Future research could explicitly test this possibility by including a condition that 
both describes the concept of implicit bias but also makes it self-relevant for participants. The 
perceived intent of discrimination committed by another person might still be reduced, but the 
reminder that one could perpetuate similar instances of bias themselves might disrupt the 
relationship between intent and harm or punishment, bolstering support for punishment for 
discrimination associated with implicit bias.  
Highlighting causes of implicit bias that are under individual concern. Another way to 
share the concept of implicit bias without undermining responses to discrimination would be to 
highlight the antecedents of implicit bias that are under individual control, like exposure to 
stereotypical media or de facto segregation from racial minorities in work and housing. This 
approach seems to be less common in trainings than demonstrations of the IAT. One benefit of 
this approach is that it makes clear that specific choices in daily life can contribute to implicit 
bias and discrimination. A related suggestion might be to introduce implicit bias along with 
concrete ways that people can de-bias their behavior, highlighting individuals’ personal 
responsibility for their behavior. A final suggestion would to pair information about the 
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activation of unconscious negative stereotypes with information that applying those stereotypes 
to targets requires intentional action (e.g., Devine, 1989). 
Framing implicit bias as a “problem.” Finally, a third strategy for discussing the concept 
of implicit bias is to explicitly refer to implicit bias as a “problem.” This is arguably the 
dominant way that implicit bias is portrayed in diversity trainings, along with being paired with 
strategies for combating the effect of implicit bias on decision making. In the Clinton quote in 
the epigraph, she frames implicit bias as a problem, whereas Saletan portrays it as an 
unavoidable reality. There has not been an empirical examination of whether implicit bias is 
more likely to be framed in one of these two ways, but this would be an important contribution to 
our understanding of the way the concept is being deployed. In the studies in this investigation 
implicit bias is not explicitly refered to as a “problem” per se, racial bias is simply defined in 
terms of implicit bias or explicit bias. Perhaps specifically identifying implicit and explicit bias 
as “problems” rather than leaving that to be assumed would reduce the effect of implicit bias 
framing on intent. A potential study with a 2x2 design could frame implicit and explicit bias as a 
problem or not. The prediction would be that when there is no mention of a problem, as in the 
current studies, implicit bias framing will result in reduced perceived intent compared to explicit 
bias framing, however, perhaps when racial bias is framed as a problem, there will be no 
difference in the effect of implicit bias versus explicit bias on perceived intent. 
Implications for Targets of Prejudice 
Does implicit bias framing increase perceptions that victims are complainers? The 
data from Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that not only does framing racial bias in terms of implicit 
bias affect perceived intent and support for punishment with respect to the perpetrator of 
discrimination, but it also influences perceptions of those who are targets of discrimination. The 
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data reported here suggest that framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias results in 
discrimination being seen as less intentional and as a result, the discriminator is less personally 
responsible. In response, observers might assign more responsibility to the targets of 
discrimination. This is in line with the literature that finds that when minorities attribute harms 
they have experienced to discrimination, they are more likely to be perceived as “complainers” 
than victims (Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 2009).  
Targets are disliked and perceived as complainers because they have attributed their 
negative outcomes to discrimination. If they challenge offensive but nonprejudiced behavior, or 
make internal attributions for a poor outcome, they face less condemnation (Garcia, Reser, Amo, 
Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). One study in particular found 
that victims who attribute poor outcomes to discrimination are perceived harshly specifically 
because that attribution is seen as neglecting personal responsibility, and that this was 
specifically the case for perceivers from the same group as the target (Garcia et al., 2005). In 
addition, Whites who favor anti-egalitarian and hierarchical intergroup relations respond more 
negatively to Black discrimination claimants than Whites who favor egalitarian, less hierarchical 
intergroup relations (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Kagiwara, 2006; Unzueta, Everly, & Gutiérrez, 
2014).  
The data reported here suggest that implicit bias framing could exacerbate evaluations 
that racial minorities are “complainers” for attributing harms that they experience to 
discrimination. Indeed, the effect of implicit and unintentional bias framing on blame for a 
victim of workplace discrimination was actually more statistically significant than the effect of 
implicit and unintentional bias framing on perpetrator blame. The effect of framing 
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discrimination in terms of implicit bias on perceptions of victims of discrimination is a fruitful 
arena for additional inquiry. 
How does implicit bias framing affect racial minorities’ perceptions of 
discrimination that happens to others? Finally, because of the focus on White respondents, the 
present work leaves unanswered how exposure to implicit bias information affects racial 
minorities’ perceptions of racial discrimination. In line with a literature on diverging perceptions 
of race-related issues (e.g., Shelton & Richeson, 2006) it is important not to assume that Whites 
and racial minorities will respond similarly to framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias. With 
respect to members of groups who tend to be targets of discrimination, there are two directions 
that would be useful to explore. One direction is how framing racial bias as implicit compared to 
explicit affects racial minorities’ responses to incidents of discrimination that happens to other 
people. Given that racial minorities tend to consider even subtly biased behaviors as racism 
(Sommers & Norton, 2006), they are likely to perceive harm in incidents of discrimination no 
matter how racial bias is framed. It is possible that implicit bias framing will not affect their 
responses to discrimination faced by others. Members of racial minority groups might be better 
able to separate the way an incident of discrimination is framed and whether a person who does 
something discriminatory intended it. And even if racial bias framing does affect perceived intent 
among racial minorities, it is possible that this reduction would not yield the reduction in 
sympathetic responses or vigilance for against racial discrimination that is seen here among 
White respondents. Ultimately, one possibility is that implicit bias framing exerts no effect on 
perceptions of discrimination for racial minorities.   
On the other hand, as identified in these studies, because implicit bias reduces Whites’ 
perceptions of intent and their downstream evaluations of the severity of discrimination, if racial 
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minorities perceive that this is the case, implicit bias framing might make racial minorities more 
vigilant about discrimination. Findings from moral psychology suggest that if racial minorities 
are more likely to perceive harm than Whites, they will also be more motivated to find a moral 
agent or cause of the harm than Whites, and so information about implicit bias might ultimately 
increase evaluations of how severe the discrimination is and increase support for punishment 
(Gray & Wegner, 2010). 
How does implicit bias framing affect racial minorities’ perceptions of 
discrimination that they experience themselves? A final fruitful direction would be to examine 
how framing racial bias as implicit compared to explicit affects racial minorities’ responses to 
incidents of discrimination that they themselves experience. Framing racial bias in terms of 
implicit bias rather than explicit bias might be distracting or stressful for racial minorities 
because they might be unsure whether Whites will actually consider discriminatory behavior 
racist if framed in that manner. Alternatively, racial minorities might be relieved because the 
subtle and ambiguous incidents of bias that racial minorities deal with are portrayed as racist, 
albeit unintentionally so. A study that could begin to investigate this might have participants 
recall an incident of discrimination and then have a confederate attribute the incident to implicit 
or explicit bias and assess participants’ race-based rejection sensitivity, feelings of belonging, 
and evaluations of the confederate.  
Conclusion 
In the epigraph to this paper, racial justice advocate Rinku Sen celebrated former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s suggestion that implicit bias is a problem for everyone. The 
value of such a high-profile mention was that a larger number of Americans were exposed to a 
concept that researchers and those working to reduce racial disparities had long championed. The 
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present research suggests a potential unintended consequence of this high-profile mention. 
Framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias, particularly in comparison to framing racial bias in 
terms of explicit bias, can reduce perceptions of the intent involved in discrimination which 
reduces perceptions of the severity of the discrimination. This research extends current theory 
about how race-relevant information affects intergroup outcomes by identifying the effect of 
framing racial bias in terms of implicit bias. In so doing, the present work suggests that social 
psychologists should proceed with caution when discussing implicit bias as a cause of 
discrimination. Despite the best of intentions, framing discrimination as due to implicit bias 
might reduce vigilance toward discrimination rather than increasing it.  
 
  97 
References 
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. R. (1950). The authoritarian 
personality. New York: Harper. 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Company, 
Inc. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.  
Ames, D. L., & Fiske, S. T. (2013). Intentional harms are worse, even when they’re not. 
Psychological Science, 24(9), 1755–1762. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613480507 
Anderson, C. A. (1983). The causal structure of situations: The generation of plausible causal 
attributions as a function of type of event situation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 19, 198-203.  
Arkes, H. R., & Tetlock, P. E. (2004). Attributions of implicit prejudice, or “Would Jesse 
Jackson ‘fail’ the Implicit Association Test?” Psychological Inquiry, 15(4), 257–278. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli1504_01 
Ashburn-Nardo, L., Morris, K. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2008). The Confronting Prejudiced 
Responses (CPR) model: Applying CPR in organizations. Academy of Management 
Learning & Education, 7(3), 332–342. 
Bargh, J. A., & Ferguson, M. J. (2000). Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher 
mental processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126(6), 925–945. 
Bergkvist, L., & Rossiter, J. R. (2007). The predictive validity of multiple-item versus single-
item measures of the same constructs. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(2), 175-184. 
Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2006). Arbitrary metrics in psychology. American Psychologist, 
61(1), 27–41. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.1.27 
  98 
Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2008). Unconscious racism: A concept in pursuit of a measure. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 34(1), 277–297. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131632 
Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., Klick, J., Mellers, B., Mitchell, G., & Tetlock, P. E. (2009). Strong 
claims and weak evidence: Reassessing the predictive validity of the IAT. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 94(3), 567–582. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014665 
Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., Strauts, E., Mitchell, G., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Toward a meaningful 
metric of implicit prejudice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(5), 1468–1481. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0038379 
Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Yes, but what’s the mechanism? (Don’t expect 
an easy answer). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(4), 550–558. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018933 
Cameron, C. D., Payne, B. K., & Knobe, J. (2010). Do theories of implicit race bias change 
moral judgments?. Social Justice Research, 23(4), 272-289. 
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish?: Deterrence and 
just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
83(2), 284–299. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.83.2.284 
Clark, C.J., Luguri, J.B., Ditto, P.H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A.F., Baumeister, R.F. (2014) Free to 
punish: A motivated account of free will belief. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 106(4), 501-513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035880. 
Cloherty, J. & Levine, M. (2015, March 5). Ferguson report: Rampant racism and other scathing 
findings from probe. Yahoo! News. Retrieved from www.yahoo.com  
  99 
Cooley, E., Payne, B. K., & Phillips, K. J. (2014). Implicit bias and the illusion of conscious ill 
will. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(4), 500–507. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613506123 
Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and 
experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 414–446. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.414 
Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White 
discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. Psychological Bulletin, 87(3), 546–
563. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.87.3.546 
Cushman, F., Dreber, A., Wang, Y., Costa, J. (2009). Accidental outcomes guide punishment in 
a ‘‘trembling hand’’ game. PLoS ONE, 4(8): e6699. doi:10.1371/ journal.pone.0006699. 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1), 5–18. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.56.1.5 
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup bias. Handbook of Social Psychology. 
Dovidio, J., Kawakami, K., & Beach, K. (2001). Implicit and explicit attitudes: Examination of 
the relationship between measures of intergroup bias. In R. Brown & S. L. Gaertner 
(Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 175–197). Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and 
interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(1), 62–68. 
Dovidio, J. F., ten Vergert, M., Stewart, T. L., Gaertner, S. L., Johnson, J. D., Esses, V. M., Riek, 
B. M., & Pearson, A. R. (2004). Perspective and prejudice: Antecedents and mediating 
  100 
mechanisms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1537–1549. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271177 
Duguid, M. M., & Thomas-Hunt, M. C. (2015). Condoning stereotyping? How awareness of 
stereotyping prevalence impacts expression of stereotypes. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 100(2), 343–359. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037908 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2013). African American Workgroup Report. 
Retrieved from https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/upload/African-American-
Report.pdf.  
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE model as 
an integrative framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 75–109). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Finkel, N. J. (1995). Achilles fuming, Odysseus stewing, and Hamlet brooding: On the story of 
the murder/manslaughter distinction. Nebraska Law Review, 74, 742–803. 
Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the role of intent: Toward understanding its role in stereotyping 
and prejudice. In J. S. Uleman and J. A. Bargh (eds.), Unintended Thought, Guilford 
Press, New York, pp. 253–283.  
Fiske, S. T. (2004). Intent and ordinary bias: Unintended thought and social motivation create 
casual prejudice. Social Justice Research, 17(2), 117–127. 
Forscher, P., & Devine, P. G. (2016). The role of intentions in conceptions of prejudice: An 
historical perspective. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and 
Discrimination (2nd ed., pp. 241–254). Psychology Press. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307577286_The_role_of_intentions_in_concept
ions_of_prejudice_An_historical_perspective  
  101 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. Academic Press. 
Garcia, D. M., Reser, A. H., Amo, R. B., Redersdorff, S., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). 
Perceivers’ responses to in-group and out-group members who blame a negative outcome 
on discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 769–780. 
Gawronski, B., Morrison, M., Phills, C. E., & Galdi, S. (2017). Temporal stability of implicit and 
explicit measures: A longitudinal analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
43(3), 300–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216684131  
Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet human: Implicit 
knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary consequences. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 94(2), 292–306. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.94.2.292 
Goff, P. A., Jackson, M. C., Di Leone, B. A. L., Culotta, C. M., & DiTomasso, N. A. (2014). The 
essence of innocence: Consequences of dehumanizing Black children. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 106(4), 526–545. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035663 
Graham, S., Weiner, B., & Benesh-Weiner, M. (1995). An attributional analysis of the 
development of excuse giving in aggressive and nonaggressive African American 
boys. Developmental Psychology, 31(2), 274-282. 
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science, 
315(5812), 619–619. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1134475 
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2008). The sting of intentional pain. Psychological Science, 19(12), 
1260–1262. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02208.x 
  102 
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Blaming God for our pain: Human suffering and the divine 
mind. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14(1), 7–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309350299 
Green, A. R., Carney, D. R., Pallin, D. J., Ngo, L. H., Raymond, K. L., Iezzoni, L. I., & Banaji, 
M. R. (2007). Implicit bias among physicians and its prediction of thrombolysis decisions 
for Black and White patients. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 22, 1231–1238. doi: 
10.1007/s11606-007-0258-5 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in 
implicit cognition: the implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(6), 1464. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and 
stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4–27. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.102.1.4 
Greenwald, A. G., & Krieger, L. H. (2006). Implicit bias: Scientific foundations. California Law 
Review, 94(4), 945–967. https://doi.org/10.2307/20439056 
Greenwald, A. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2001). Health of the Implicit Association Test at age 3. 
Zeitschrift Für Experimentelle Psychologie, 48(2), 85–93. 
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and 
using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17–41.  
Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., Hirsh, H. K., & Blair, I. V. (2014). Awareness of implicit attitudes. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(3), 1369–1392. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035028 
  103 
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new 
millennium. Communication Monographs, 76(4), 408–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637750903310360  
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. Guilford Press. 
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical 
independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 67(3), 
451–470. https://doi.org/10.1111/bmsp.12028 
Hayward, J. (2016, October 8). Implicit bias: The new “original sin.” Breitbart. Retrieved from: 
http://www.breitbart.com  
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le H., & Schmitt, M. (2005). A meta-analysis 
on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report 
measures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1369–1385.  
Horai, J., & Bartek, M. (1978). Recommended punishment as a function of injurious intent, 
actual harm done, and intended consequences. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 4(4), 575–578. https://doi.org/10.1177/014616727800400416 
Howell, J. L., Collisson, B., Crysel, L., Garrido, C. O., Newell, S. M., Cottrell, C. A., Smith, C. 
T., Shepperd, J. A. (2013). Managing the threat of impending implicit attitude feedback. 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(6), 714–720. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613479803 
Ikizer, E. G., & Blanton, H. (2016). Media coverage of “wise” interventions can reduce concern 
for the disadvantaged. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 22(2), 135–147. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000076  
  104 
Jost, J. T., Rudman, L. A., Blair, I. V., Carney, D. R., Dasgupta, N., Glaser, J., & Hardin, C. D. 
(2009). The existence of implicit bias is beyond reasonable doubt: A refutation of 
ideological and methodological objections and executive summary of ten studies that no 
manager should ignore. Research in Organizational Behavior, 29, 39–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2009.10.001 
Kaiser, C. R., Dyrenforth, P. S., & Hagiwara, N. (2006). Why are attributions to discrimination 
interpersonally costly? A test of system- and group-justifying motivations. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(11), 1423–1536. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291475 
Kaiser, C. R., Major, B., Jurcevic, I., Dover, T. L., Brady, L. M., & Shapiro, J. R. (2013). 
Presumed fair: Ironic effects of organizational diversity structures. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 104(3), 504–519. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030838 
Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop complaining! The social costs of making attributions 
to discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(2), 254–263. 
Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2003). Derogating the victim: The interpersonal consequences of 
blaming events on discrimination. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 6(3), 227–
237. 
Kearns, J. N., & Fincham, F. D. (2005). Victim and perpetrator accounts of interpersonal 
transgressions: Self-serving or relationship-serving biases? Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 31(3), 321–333. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271594 
Kinder, D. & Sanders, L.M. (1996). Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals. 
University of Chicago Press. 
  105 
Klemm, W. R. (2010). Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple. Advances in 
Cognitive Psychology, 6, 47–65. https://doi.org/10.2478/v10053-008-0076-2 
Lai, C. (2017, May 14). Curriculum Vitae. Retrieved from http://calvinklai.weebly.com  
Letzer, R. (2014, November 26). What social psychology says about Darren Wilson and Michael 
Brown. Popular Science. Retrieved from www.popsci.com  
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary 
action. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 529–566. 
MacKinnon, D. P., Krull, J. L., & Lockwood, C. M. (2000). Equivalence of the mediation, 
confounding, and suppression effect. Prevention Science, 1, 173–181.  
Malle, B. F., & Bennett, R. E. (2002). People’s praise and blame for intentions and actions: 
Implications of the folk concept of intentionality. (Technical Reports of the Institute of 
Cognitive and Decision Sciences No. 02 - 2). Eugene, OR: Institute of Cognitive and 
Decision Sciences. Retrieved from 
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/961/icds02-
02tech.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). A theory of blame. Psychological Inquiry, 
25(2), 147–186. http://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2014.877340 
Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 33(2), 101–121. 
Mengell, G. (2017, January 12). Trump, implicit bias, and the dream of racial progress. 
Huffington Post. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost.com  
Monroe, A. E., Brady, G. L., & Malle, B. F. (2017). This isn’t the free will worth looking for: 
General free will beliefs do not influence moral judgments, agent-specific choice 
  106 
ascriptions do. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(2), 191–199. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616667616 
Monteith, M. J., Voils, C. I., & Ashburn-Nardo, L. (2001). Taking a look underground: 
Detecting, interpreting, and reacting to implicit racial biases. Social Cognition, 19(4), 
395–417. http://doi.org/10.1521/soco.19.4.395.20759 
Nordell, J (2017, May 7) Is this how discrimination ends? The Atlantic. Retrieved from 
https://www.theatlantic.com  
Ohtsubo, Y. (2007). Perceiver intentionality intensifies blameworthiness of negative behaviors: 
Blame-praise asymmetry in intensification effect. Japanese Psychological Research, 49, 
100-110.  
Perry, S. P., Murphy, M. C., & Dovidio, J. F. (2015). Modern prejudice: Subtle, but 
unconscious? The role of bias awareness in Whites’ perceptions of personal and others’ 
biases. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 61, 64–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.06.007 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 57–75. 
Pope, D. G., Price, J., & Wolfers, J. (2014). Awareness reduces racial bias. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w19765 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and re-sampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 
879–891. doi:10.3758/BRM.40.3.879 
Price, J., & Wolfers, J. (2010). Racial discrimination among NBA referees. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 125(4), 1859–1887. 
  107 
Redford, L., & Ratliff, K. A. (2016). Perceived moral responsibility for attitude-based 
discrimination. British Journal of Social Psychology, 55(2), 279–296. 
Richeson, J. A., & Sommers, S. R. (2016). Toward a social psychology of race and race relations 
for the twenty-first century. Annual Review of Psychology, 67(1), 439–463. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115115 
Roy, R. E., Weibust, K. S., & Miller, C. T. (2009). If she’s a feminist it must not be 
discrimination: The power of the feminist label on observers’ attributions about a sexist 
event. Sex Roles, 60(5-6), 422–431. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9556-6 
Rucker, D. D., Preacher, K. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Mediation analysis in 
social psychology: Current practices and new recommendations. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 5(6), 359–371. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00355.x 
Ruiz, R. (2015, March, 29). Despite loss, Ellen Pao succeeded in calling out subtle sexism. 
Mashable. Retrieved from www.mashable.com  
Saletan, W. (2016, October 5). Implicit bias is real. Don’t be so defensive. Slate. Retrieved from 
www.slate.com  
Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., & Krysan, M. (1997). Racial attitudes in America: Trends and 
interpretations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2005). Over thirty years later: A contemporary look at symbolic 
racism. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 37, pp. 95–150). 
Sen, R. (2012). Countering implicit bias. Retrieved from 
https://www.raceforward.org/press/toolbox/countering-implicit-bias  
  108 
Shariff, A.F., Greene, J.D., Karremans, J.C., Luguri, J.B., Clark, C.J., Schooler, J.W., 
Baumeister, R.F., & Vohs, K.D. (2014). Free will and punishment: A mechanistic view 
of human nature reduces retribution. Psychological Science, 25 (8), 1563-1570. 
Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness. 
New York: Springer-Verlag.  
Shelton, J. N., & Richeson, J. A. (2006). Interracial interactions: A relational approach. Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 121–181. 
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New 
procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7, 422–445.  
Singal, J. (2017, January 11). Psychology’s favorite tool for measuring racism isn’t up to the job. 
New York Magazine. Retrieved from www.nymag.com  
Singer, R. (1985). Resurgence of mens rea: I–Provocation, emotional disturbance, and the Model 
Penal Code, The Boston College Law Review, 27(2), 243-322. 
Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Meritocracy and opposition to 
affirmative action: Making concessions in the face of discrimination. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 493–509. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.83.3.493 
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why 
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining 
psychological processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 845–851. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.845  
  109 
Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2006). Lay theories about White racists: What constitutes 
racism (and what doesn’t). Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 117–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059881 
Stockman, F. (2016, September 29). The subtle phrases Hillary Clinton uses to sway Black 
voters. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com  
Swim, J. K., Scott, E. D., Sechrist, G. B., Campbell, B., & Stangor, C. (2003). The role of intent 
and harm in judgments of prejudice and discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84(5), 944–959. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.944 
Taylor, S. P., Shuntich, R. J., & Greenberg, A. (1979). The effects of repeated aggressive 
encounters on subsequent aggressive behavior. The Journal of Social Psychology, 107(2), 
199-208. doi: 10.1080/00224545.1979.9922699 
Todd, A. R., Bodenhausen, G. V., Richeson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2011). Perspective taking 
combats automatic expressions of racial bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 100(6), 1027–1042. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022308 
Unzueta, M. M., Everly, B. A., & Gutiérrez, A. S. (2014). Social dominance orientation 
moderates reactions to Black and White discrimination claimants. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 81–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.04.005 
Wallace, L., Johnson, V., Eberhardt, J., & Markus, H. (n.d.). Principled policing: Procedural 
justice and implicit bias training. California Department of Justice and Stanford SPARQ. 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement-related emotion and motivation. 
Psychological Review, 29, 548–573. 
Weiner, B. (1993). On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social 
motivation. American Psychologist, 48(9), 957-965. 
  110 
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Chandler, C. (1982). Pity, anger, and guilt: An attributional 
analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8(2), 226-232. 
Weiner, B., & Kukla, A. (1970). An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 15(1), 1-20. 
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. Psychological 
Review, 107, 101–126.  
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2011). When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across 
moral domains. Cognition, 120(2), 202–214. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005 
Zhao, X., Lynch, J. G., Jr, & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and 
truths about mediation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 37, 197–206.  
